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Plain Meaning,
Precedent, and
Metaphysics:
Interpreting the
“Pollutant”
Element of the
Federal Water
Pollution Offense
by Jeffrey G. Miller
Jeffrey G. Miller is Professor of Law
Emeritus at Pace Law School.

Summary
This Article, the second in a series of five, examines the
meaning of “pollutant” under the Clean Water Act.
Congress and EPA have defined “pollutant” to mean a
list of specific substances and broad categories of materials and wastes discharged into water, e.g., “biological materials” and “chemical wastes.” The definition
is broad enough to encompass virtually all substances
associated with human activity that are discharged to
water, regardless of whether the substances cause pollution or are produced through human endeavor. Therefore, “pollutant” is rarely a limiting element. Instead,
the issues with the definition of “pollutant” primarily
address whether it includes material used in common
and productive activities, such as adding hatcheryraised fish (“biological material”) to trout streams or
spraying pesticides to suppress disease-bearing mosquitoes (“biological material” or “chemical wastes”).
EPA can easily fix these and other problems by a better regulatory definition.
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I.

Introduction

The Clean Water Act (CWA)1 prohibits “the discharge of
any pollutant by any person,” unless in compliance with
several listed sections in §301(a).2 The listed sections authorize the issuance of two types of CWA permits and specify
their substantive requirements.3 In §502(12) the statute
defines “discharge of a pollutant” to mean “any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”4
In sum, the subsection prohibits (1) any addition (2) of any
pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from any point source
(5) by any person, except in compliance with a CWA permit. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has
called this the “core command” of the CWA.5 This is the
second in a series of five articles examining how the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the courts
have interpreted the initial four jurisdictional elements
of the federal water pollution control offense from 1972
to 2012.6 The first four articles in the series examine each
of the first four elements, and a fifth article explores differences in the techniques courts have used to interpret
them. Disputes over the interpretations of these elements
have produced a steady stream of reported decisions since
the initial implementation of the statute. Even after four
decades, many of the issues are unresolved and new issues
continue to surface.
These articles have two purposes. The first is to provide
definitive analyses of the initial four elements. Because
many of the most difficult issues under several of the elements arise from the same fact patterns, one hypothesis is
that examining these elements in depth in the same project
will make it easier to resolve the common issues. Because
many EPA and judicial interpretations obscure elements
by conflating them with other elements, another hypothesis is that examining each element alone and in depth will
illuminate its singular meaning and its relations with other
elements. The second purpose is to explore the methods
1.	 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR Stat. FWPCA §§101-607.
2.	 33 U.S.C. §1311(a).
3.	 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues permits under CWA §402, 33 U.S.C. §1242, to regulate water pollution, and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) issues permits under CWA
§404, 33 U.S.C. §1344, to regulate the filling of wetlands and other
navigable waters.
4.	 33 U.S.C. §1362(12).
5.	 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S.
261, 298 (2009). The author has elsewhere called the subsection “the basic
prohibition” of the CWA. See Jeffrey G. Miller et al., Introduction
to Environmental Law: Cases and Materials on Water Pollution
Control 141 (2008).
6.	 The other elements of the offense are similarly deserving of individual analysis, but space constraints preclude their discussion in this Article. The author’s analysis of the “addition” element of the offense was published in an
earlier issue of ELR News & Analysis. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain Meaning,
Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Addition” Element of the Clean
Water Act Offense, 44 ELR 10770 (Sept. 2014).
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that EPA and the courts have used to interpret the elements. One hypothesis is that the very different natures
of the four elements will result in different frequencies of
judicial challenges, different ratios of expansive to narrow
interpretations, and different interpretive devices used by
the courts. Another hypothesis is that statutory interpretation is dynamic: both the interpretations of the elements
and the methods used to interpret them evolve over time,
reflecting the maturation of the statute and developments
in jurisprudence.
The CWA defines pollutant to mean a list of 18 specific substances and categories of substances “discharged
into water,” with two specific exclusions in §502(6). The
categories include biological and radioactive materials,
and solid, chemical, industrial, municipal, and agricultural wastes. While many substances may not initially
fall into one of these categories, once such materials are
discharged into water, most become waste and then fall
within one of the waste categories. As a consequence, it is
difficult to imagine a substance discharged into water that
is not included in one of the categories. The definition of
pollutant is qualitatively different in this regard from the
definitions of two other elements defined in the CWA,
“point source” and “navigable water.” 7 Both of them
have statutorily enunciated opposites. “Point sources” are
confined, discrete conveyances, but the CWA recognizes
their opposites: nonpoint sources such as surface runoff.
“Navigable waters” may be a broad term, but the CWA
recognizes their opposites: non-navigable waters such as
groundwater. And, of course, water has its opposite: dry
land. But what is the opposite of a “pollutant”? A substance that does not pollute? We will see that the U.S.
Congress divorced the meanings of pollutant and pollution. Or is the opposite of a pollutant a substance that is
not listed or not part of a listed category? Name a substance that does not fall into a listed category when it is
discharged into water.
The definition of pollutant is extremely broad. As a
consequence, almost all decisions considering whether a
particular substance is a pollutant should be answered
positively. Because it is fairly clear that most substances
are pollutants, fewer decisions should consider whether
the pollutant element of the offense is met than whether
other elements of the offense are met. Finally, most courts
should use the plain meaning of the definition to determine whether a substance is a pollutant. Once courts
have held that a variety of substances are pollutants,
precedent also should become a frequently used shortcut interpretive device. Courts should not often engage
in extensive interpretations of pollutant. The interesting
pollutant decisions, therefore, will be those holding sub7.	

CWA §502(7) & (14), 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) & (14).
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stances not to be pollutants and decisions using multiple
interpretive devices. These decisions should point to the
fault lines between pollutants and their opposites, whatever they are. Or as Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor has commented, they are the “muddy, unclear and
gray cases.”8
The Article begins by examining congressional actions
illuminating the meaning of pollutant. It parses the statutory definitions of pollutant and related terms; identifies
the contexts in which Congress used the term in the statute and how the term relates to other defined terms in the
statute; and reviews relevant legislative history. Next, the
Article catalogues the substances that courts have held are,
or are not, pollutants; and analyzes EPA and judicial interpretations of pollutant. Finally, the Article identifies and
discusses prominent or difficult issues that EPA and the
courts have resolved in their interpretations.

II.

Legislative and Administrative
Definitions of Pollutant and Related
Terms

A.

Statutory Definitions

1.

Pollutant

Although “pollutant” has a familiar common meaning as
something that pollutes, §502(6) defines it to mean a list
of 18 specific substances or categories of substances9 “discharged into water,” with two exclusions.10 EPA’s regulatory
definition is virtually identical.11 Because the definition states
that pollutant means a list of specific substances or categories
of substances, the list is an exclusive one and nothing else can
be a pollutant.12 The exclusive nature of this list is emphasized
8.	
9.	

10.

11.

12.

Remarks by Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor at Pace Law School
(Nov. 12, 2012) (commenting on cases that comprise the Supreme
Court’s docket).
CWA §502(6), 33 U.S.C. §1362(6). Dredged spoil, incinerator residue,
sewage sludge, munitions, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand
and cellar dirt (specific substances); solid waste, sewage, garbage, chemical
wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, industrial, municipal, and
agriculture waste (categories of substances). Heat, which is included in the
list, is not a substance or material, although it could be a waste. Some of the
substances on the list could be considered either a material or a category of
material, e.g., dredged spoil or sewage.
Id. The exclusions are: (1) sewage from vessels regulated by CWA §312,
33 U.S.C. §1322; and (2) water, gas, or other material pumped into wells
to facilitate production of petroleum products or pumped onto wells for
disposal of wastes pursuant to state permits.
It adds “filter backwash” to and drops “cellar dirt” from the list, qualifies “radioactive materials” as those not regulated under the Atomic
Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§2011 et seq., and restates the two exceptions
in minor ways.
An exclusive definition, using “means,” is confined to the specifics of the
definition, while an inclusive definition, using “includes,” is not. See Sierra
Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 565, 26
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by its contrast with the only other statutory definition of an
element containing a list, the definition of “point source,”
which “includes” a nonexclusive list of examples. Although
the definition of pollutant is an exclusive one, meaning only
the specific substances or categories of substances listed,
the categories are broad enough to cover virtually all substances and wastes generated by human activity.13 Because
of the specificity of the listed substances and the breadth of
the listed categories, courts should interpret the definition by
using plain meaning more often than using other devices for
statutory construction.14 For the same reasons, courts should
hold most substances to be pollutants, except under unusual
circumstances. As discussed below, one such circumstance is
when another statute regulates the substance or the activity
producing it, potentially creating a conflict between application of the two statutes.

2.

Toxic Pollutant

The CWA also defines “toxic pollutant” in §502(13).15 It
might be assumed that the CWA regulates only substances
that have some toxic effect. This is not the case, however,
because substances Congress listed as pollutants include
nontoxic substances, e.g., rock and sand. Indeed, by defining and using the phrase “toxic pollutant,” Congress identified a subset of pollutants subject to advanced pollution
control. While §301(a) declared it illegal to discharge any
pollutant except in compliance with a permit, and §301(b)
(a) established treatment requirements for the discharge of
all pollutants, §§301(b)(2)(A) and 307(a) established more
stringent pollution control for the discharge of toxic pollutants. A substance may be a pollutant without being a
toxic pollutant, although a substance may not be a toxic
pollutant without being a pollutant.16
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is a substance that causes pollution. The plain meaning of pollutant, however, is not relevant to interpreting
the term as it is used in the CWA, because the statute
specifically states that “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, when used in this [statute] . . . [t]he term
‘pollutant’ means . . .” the definition discussed above.
Other parts of the statute support the inapplicability of
the plain meaning of pollutant in the CWA. The list of
materials or categories of materials that are pollutants
includes substances that in the common understanding
do not pollute, for example, rock, sand, and some biological material such as indigenous live fish. Few would
argue that their favorite waterway is free of pollutants or
pollution only when it is without native fish swimming
in it or a sand or rock bottom. Congress was aware of the
concept of pollution when it drafted the CWA; indeed,
Congress defined pollution and used it in the title17 and
throughout the statute.18 The CWA defined pollution as
the “man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical,
biological, and radiological integrity of water,”19 without
mentioning pollutant. Thus, Congress decoupled “pollutant” and “pollution” by defining each without reference
to the other. A “pollutant” is a substance falling within
a statutory list of substances or categories of substances,
without regard to whether it causes pollution. “Pollution”
is a negative effect on the integrity of water caused by
human activity, without regard to whether it is caused by
a pollutant. It is worth noting that plain meaning is useful in interpreting the words used in the statutory definition of pollutant, although it is not useful in interpreting
the word pollutant as it is used in the statute.

B.

Legislative History

The absence of any reference to pollution in the definition of “pollutant” has occasionally confused lawyers and
judges because the common understanding of pollutant

The legislative history of the CWA indicates that Congress intended its definition of pollutant to be expansive,
leaving EPA with the authority to define what the term
means under particular circumstances. Section 502(6)
incorporated the definition of pollutant from the U.S.
Senate bill, S. 2770, with a few changes.20 The Senate

ELR 20522 (5th Cir. 1996). The difference is emphasized for the definition
of pollutant because it contained an inclusive list in its U.S. Senate version,
but was changed to contain an exclusive list in the Conference Committee.
See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 132-33 (2012).
The breadth of the categories included in the list “tends to eviscerate any
restrictive effect” of the definition. See Cedar Point, 73 F.3d at 565; see also
National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 172, 13 ELR 20015
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
The author’s research has found that courts used plain meaning in 55 of the
68 decisions interpreting “pollutant.”
The term “means those pollutants or combinations of pollutants . . . which
. . . cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions . . . or physical deformations, in such organisms or their offspring.”
Dague v. City of Burlington, 732 F. Supp. 458, 469-70, 20 ELR 21001
(D. Vt. 1989), aff’d, 935 F.2d 1343, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d
on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557, 22 ELR 21099 (1992). In Headwaters, Inc.
v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532-33, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir.
2001), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit commented regarding a pesticide that “it would be absurd to conclude that a toxic chemical
directly poured into water is not a pollutant.”

17. The original Federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted on June 30,
1948, c. 758, 62 Stat. 1155, and was amended several times before the
Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, Oct. 18, 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-500, cast the statute substantially in its present form. The Clean
Water Act Amendments of 1977, Dec. 27, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, made
some mid-course corrections to the 1972 legislation. The statute has commonly been referred to thereafter as the Clean Water Act.
18. For instance, the first section used “pollution” six times, CWA §101, 33
U.S.C. §1251, and the penultimate section used it four times, CWA §60,
33 U.S.C. §1386.
19. CWA §502(19).
20. The enacted statutory definition eliminated from the Senate’s version “but
not limited to” after “means,” and “other waste” after “agricultural waste.” S.
Rep. No. 1236 (Conf. Rep.), at 143-44 (1972), 1 Legis. Hist. 281, 326-27.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit commented that “while . . .
the elimination of [these phrases] may be interpreted as an attempt to limit
the scope of the definition . . . we think that the retention of such broad
terms in the definitions suggests that the conference committee may have
determined that the eliminated phrases were simply redundant,” in view of
the broad coverage of “‘solid waste,’ . . . ‘chemical wastes,’ ‘biological materials,’ . . . and ‘industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste. . . .’” Sierra Club,
Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 566, 26 ELR

3.

13.

14.
15.

16.

Pollution
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Committee Report accompanying S. 2770 indicated that
the Senate bill defined pollutant to avoid litigation over
whether particular materials were subject to CWA jurisdiction, suggesting a broad interpretation of the term.
That suggestion is supported by the Committee’s explicit
adoption of “the basic formula [from the Refuse Act, but
adding] . . . municipal discharges to it, so [that] before
any material can be added to navigable waters authorization must first be granted by the Administrator.”21 The
Refuse Act of 189922 was indeed broad, prohibiting the
discharge of “any refuse matter of any kind or description
whatever” to navigable water or its tributaries without a
permit, with the exception of liquid waste from streets
or sewers.23 Adding discharges from streets and sewers
to the Refuse Act’s already expansive concept of regulated substances provided the CWA with an even broader
reach of “pollutant.”
On the Senate floor, Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) asked
Sen. Edmund Muskie (D-Me.), the author and chief
sponsor of the CWA in the Senate, whether “pollutant”
included fish parts discharged in various marine environments. Senator Muskie replied: “I do not get into the business of defining or applying these definitions to particular
kinds of pollutants. That is an administrative decision to
be made by the Administrator [of EPA].”24 Courts have
generally recognized the authority of EPA to define “pollutant” and other jurisdictional terms of §301(a),25 based
on this and similar evidence.26 In National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit stated: “Strong signals in the
Congressional history [indicate] that [Congress] entrusted
EPA with at least some discretion which ‘pollutants’
and sources of pollutants were to be regulated under the
NPDES program.”27

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.

27.

20522 (5th Cir. 1996). See also National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693
F.2d 156, 173, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
S. Rep. No. 92-414, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3742 (emphasis added). See
United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 110-11, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir.
1977).
33 U.S.C. §407 (emphasis added). The Refuse Act provided the model for
the permit program established in CWA §402.
See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 66366, 3 ELR 20401 (1973) (tracing the evolution of the Refuse Act and its
broad coverage).
117 Cong. Rec. 38838 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971).
See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 167, 173-74. Based on a similar congressional
colloquy, the district court in Natural Res. Defense Council v. Train, 396 F.
Supp. 1393, 1396, 1401, 5 ELR 20401 (D.D.C. 1975), held that the CWA
gave EPA discretion to define the meaning of “point source.” The D.C.
Circuit agreed. See Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d
1369, 1382, 8 ELR 20028 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Some courts have articulated their authority to make such determinations
in the absence of an EPA determination. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Lone Star
Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 26 ELR 20522 (5th Cir.
1996); U.S. PIRG v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239,
246, 32 ELR 20535 (D. Me. 2002).
See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 173.
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III. Judicial Interpretations of Pollutant
A.

Substances Held to Be a Pollutant or Not to Be
a Pollutant

1.

Held to Be a Pollutant

Courts have held the following substances to be a “pollutant”: acid mine drainage28; blood29; bombs, ordnance,
and spent shot30; cement and shotcrete31; changes in water
conditions32; chemical waste, including chlorine residue
and alum sludge33; demolition debris34; dredged and fill
material35; fecal coliform36; live and dead fish, fish parts
and feces, and shellfish feces37; listed toxic pollutants38; animal manure39; municipal solid waste40; pesticides, pesticide
28. Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d
305, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir. 1993); Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte
Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 26 ELR 20639 (D. Mont. 1995).
29. United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, 3 F.3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d
Cir. 1993).
30. Weinberger v. Barcelo-Romero, 456 U.S. 305, 309, 12 ELR 20538 (1982)
(bombs); Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York Athletic Club,
1996 WL 131863 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (spent shot and target fragments).
31. United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 23 ELR 21012 (3d Cir. 1993) (concrete rubble and cement blocks); United States v. Schalloom, 998 F.2d 196
(4th Cir. 1993).
32. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 12 ELR 20268
(D.D.C. 1982), rev’d, 693 F.2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 8 ELR 20757
(D.S.C. 1978).
33. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 7 ELR 20419 (7th Cir. 1977);
Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 21
ELR 20647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
34. United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 880, 12 ELR 20629 (D. Md.
1981).
35. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S.
261, 302-03 (2009); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723, 745, 36
ELR 20116 (2006); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1391, 25
ELR 21046 (9th Cir. 1995); Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
968 F.2d 1438, 1445, 22 ELR 21337 (1st Cir. 1992); Bersani v. EPA, 850
F.2d 36, 39, 18 ELR 20874 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Brink, 795
F. Supp. 2d 565, 575 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Gouger v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 779 F. Supp. 2d 588, 603 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Alabama Rivers Alliance v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 697 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1258 (N.D. Ala.
2009); D’Olive Bay Restoration and Pres. Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (S.D. Ala. 2007); Florida Wildlife
Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (S.D. Fla.
2005); City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 332 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1015 (S.D.
Tex. 2004); National Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton, 332 F. Supp. 2d 170, 185
(D.D.C. 2004); Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204
F. Supp. 2d 927, 932, n.5 (S.D. W. Va. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 317
F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003).
36. North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC, 278 F.
Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003) (soil and vegetation).
37. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989, 17
ELR 20801 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (live fish, dead fish, and fish parts), rev’d on
other grounds, 862 F.2d 580, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir. 1988); U.S. PIRG v.
Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239, 32 ELR 20535 (D.
Me. 2002) (non-native live fish, fish feces); contra Association to Protect
Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F.3d 1007 (9th
Cir. 2002) (shellfish feces).
38. Dague v. City of Burlington, 732 F. Supp. 458, 469-70, 20 ELR 21001 (D.
Vt. 1989).
39. Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d
114, 24 ELR 21480 (2d Cir. 1994) (cow manure); Higbee v. Starr, 598 F.
Supp. 323 (W.D. Ark. 1984) (hog manure); United States v. Frezzo Bros.,
461 F. Supp. 266, 9 ELR 20139 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d, 602 F.2d 1123, 9
ELR 20556 (3d Cir. 1979) (composted horse manure).
40. Resource Invs., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 151 F.3d 1162, 28 ELR
21407 (9th Cir. 1998).
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waste, and pesticide residue41; petroleum products42; produced water43; rock, rubble, bricks, and sand44; sediment45;
sewage46; soil and vegetation47; and stormwater.48

2.

Held Not to Be a Pollutant

Courts have held the following substances not to be a “pollutant”: air pollutants49; changes in water condition50; clear
water51; pesticides, pesticide wastes and pesticide residue52;
radioactive materials53; rock and sediment in stormwater54;
41. National Cotton Council of Am. v. U.S. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR 20006
(6th Cir. 2009) (sprayed pesticide residue and waste); Headwaters, Inc. v.
Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir. 2001).
42. United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 27 ELR 20853 (11th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir. 1977).
43. Produced water is pumped from groundwater or accompanies other products produced by drilling (e.g., oil and gas). Northern Plains Resource
Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Dev. Co. 325 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003)
(unaltered groundwater); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil
Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 26 ELR 20522 (5th Cir. 1996) (produced water or
its constituents).
44. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S.
261, 268 (2009) (crushed rock); United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 23
ELR 21012 (3d Cir. 1993) (concrete rubble, cement blocks); Minnehana
Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 9 ELR 20334 (8th Cir.
1979) (rock and sand used in constructing dam and rip rap); Kentuckians
for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927, 932, n.5
(S.D. W. Va. 2002) (mining overburden agreed by parties to be a pollutant), rev’d on other grounds, 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003); Hanson v. United
States, 710 F. Supp. 1105, 19 ELR 21074 (E.D. Tex. 1989) (dirt, rock,
bricks); United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 880, 12 ELR 20629 (D.
Md. 1981 (demolition debris and sand).
45. Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 32 ELR
20011 (9th Cir. 2001) (soil and vegetation); United States v. Deaton, 209
F.3d 331, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir. 2000) (soil); Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d
1285, 29 ELR 21387 (11th Cir. 1999) (sand and silt were the two primary
constituents of sediment); United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 28 ELR
20299 (4th Cir. 1997) (native soil); Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 20
ELR 20973 (9th Cir. 1990) (dirt and gravel); United States v. M.C.C. of
Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 15 ELR 21091 (11th Cir. 1985) (vegetation
and sediment); Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp, 78 F.3d 1523, 26 ELR 20924
(11th Cir. 1996) (sediment in rainwater flowing from construction site);
Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist., 597 F.2d 617 (rock and sand); Tungett v.
Papierski, 2006 WL 51148 (E.D. Tenn. 2006) (sediment, soil, dirt); North
Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC, 278 F. Supp.
2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003) (soil, sand, and dirt); Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F.
Supp. 2d 1337, 30 ELR 20460 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp.
880 (demolition debris and sand).
46. United States v. Gulf Park Water Co. 972 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
47. Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d 810 (vegetation); M.C.C. of Florida, 772 F.2d 1501
(sea grass); Tungett, 2006 WL 51148 (trees, organic debris).
48. Driscoll, 181 F.3d 1285; Hughey, 78 F.3d 1523 (construction site runoff);
United States v. Frezzo Bros., 461 F. Supp. 266, 9 ELR 20139 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (mushroom growing waste runoff), aff’d, 602 F.2d 1123, 9 ELR
20556 (3d Cir. 1979).
49. U.S. EPA ex rel. McKeown v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 162
F. Supp. 2d 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also Chemical Weapons Working Grp.
v. Dep’t of Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 27 ELR 21130 (10th Cir. 1997).
50. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); contra South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp.
118, 8 ELR 20757 (D.S.C. 1978).
51. Orleans Audubon Soc’y v. Lee, 742 F.2d 901, 15 ELR 20030 (5th Cir.
1984).
52. Fairhurst v. Hagener, 422 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2005); Peconic Baykeeper,
Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty., 585 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d in part,
600 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2010); Altman v. Town of Amherst, New York, 190
F. Supp. 2d 467 (W.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d, 47 Fed. Appx. 62 (2d Cir. 2002).
53. Train v. Colorado PIRG, 426 U.S. 1, 6 ELR 20549 (1976); Waste Action
Project v. Dawn Mining Corp., 137 F.3d 1426, 28 ELR 21035 (9th Cir.
1998).
54. Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425 (4th
Cir. 2003); Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438,
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and shellfish parts and feces.55 For four of these seven substances there are contrary decisions. Ten of the 13 narrow
interpretations were rendered in citizen suits56 and nine of
the 13 were decided during or after 1996.57 Most of the
negative decisions were grounded on avoiding interference
with pervasive regulation by another statute of the substance at issue or the activity producing it.

B.

Listed Substances Versus Listed Categories of
Substances

Some decisions held a substance to be a pollutant because
it is specifically listed in the definition of pollutant.58
But most decisions held a substance to be a pollutant
because it fell within a category of substance listed in the
definition,59 frequently biological material,60 or chemical,61
agricultural,62 solid,63 or industrial waste.64 “Biological

55.

56.
57.
58.
59.

60.

61.

62.

63.
64.

22 ELR 21337 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. United Homes, Inc., 1999
WL 117701 (N.D. Ind. 1999). The court did not address whether contaminated river water was a pollutant in Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. City of
New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 1102, 21 ELR 20647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d
without opinion, 940 F.2d 649, 21 ELR 21226 (2d Cir. 1991).
Association to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res.,
Inc., 299 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002); contra National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 19 ELR 20235 (W.D. Mich. 1987); U.S.
PIRG v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239, 32 ELR
20535 (D. Me. 2002).
The author’s research has found that, by contrast, 34 of the 68 decisions
interpreting pollutant were citizen suit cases.
By contrast, the author’s research has found that 37 of the 68 decisions were
during or after 1996.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Barcelo-Romero, 456 U.S. 305, 309, 12 ELR 20538
(1982).
Congress’ use of “broad generic terms” indicated legislative intent to capture
as pollutants more than the substances specifically listed. See United States v.
Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir. 1977); Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n, 751 F. Supp. at 1101.
National Cotton Council of Am. v. U.S. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR 20006
(6th Cir. 2009) (biologically based pesticides); Consumers Power, 862 F.2d
580 (live fish, dead fish, and fish parts); North Carolina Shellfish Growers
Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC, 278 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003)
(fecal coliform); Atlantic Salmon of Maine, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239 (fish feces);
National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989, 17
ELR 20801 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (live fish, dead fish, and fish parts); United
States v. Frezzo Bros., 461 F. Supp. 266, 9 ELR 20139 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(composted horse manure). In the district court decision upheld in Hamel,
551 F.2d at 110, “the government contended successfully . . . that gasoline
could be subsumed under ‘biological materials,’’’ although the appeals court
upheld the decision on a different basis.
National Cotton Council, 553 F.3d 927 (chemical pesticide residue); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir.
2001) (chemical pesticide residue); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar
Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 26 ELR 20522 (5th Cir. 1996) (produced
water); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 7 ELR 20419 (7th Cir.
1977) (steel-making waste); North Carolina Shellfish Growers, 278 F. Supp.
2d 654; Dague v. City of Burlington, 732 F. Supp. 458, 20 ELR 21001 (D.
Vt. 1989), aff’d, 935 F.2d 1343, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d on
other grounds, 505 U.S. 557, 22 ELR 21099 (1992) (leachate from landfill).
Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm, 34
F.3d 114, 24 ELR 21480 (2d Cir. 1994) (cow manure); Atlantic Salmon of
Maine, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 246 (waste from fish farm); Higbee v. Starr, 598
F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Ark. 1984).
United States v. Schallom, 998 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1993) (sand and cement);
Higbee, 598 F. Supp. 223.
Northern Plains Resource Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Dev. Co.,
325 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (produced water from gas extraction); United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 27 ELR 20853 (11th Cir. 1997) (tank
bottoms pumped from gas station); Cedar Point, 73 F.3d 546 (produced
water from oil drilling).
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material” covers all living or formerly living carbonaceous
matter, including substances in fossilized form such as a
fossil fuel. “Solid waste,” “chemical waste,” “industrial,
municipal, and agricultural waste,” however, describe the
byproducts or leftover results of human activity. Indeed,
they cover most conceivable byproducts and residuals of
human activity. Moreover, once most non-waste materials
are discharged to water, they become waste. For instance,
commercially valuable petroleum products become waste
when they are spilled from a vessel at sea. Although not
noted in the decisions, a substance could fall into more
than one listed category. Leftover tar from road paving,
for instance, could be biological material, chemical waste,
solid waste, municipal waste, and industrial waste. In the
few decisions holding a substance not to be a pollutant, the
substance at issue might have fit within a listed category,
but the court nevertheless held it not to be a pollutant for
other reasons.65

1.

Waste Categories Versus Material Categories

Most of the broad categories of pollutants are designated
“waste(s)” or “materials.”66 Although the CWA does not
define either term, material is a broader category than
waste.67 Material describes the substance before, during,
and after human use and even a substance that is not
associated with human use.68 Waste, on the other hand,
describes material that remains after human use or after
abandonment without use, such as oil spilled from a vessel at sea.69 One court, however, has held that both waste
65. For instance, in Association to Protect Hammersley, Eld and Totten Inlets v.
Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit held that
feces and shells from mussel-growing and harvesting facilities were not pollutants, although they were biological material. The court was largely motivated by the incongruity of holding the byproducts of shellfish propagation
to be pollutants, when the goal of the CWA is to protect and promote the
propagation of fish and shellfish. The Supreme Court in Train v. Colorado
PIRG, 426 U.S. 1, 6 ELR 20549 (1976), and the Ninth Circuit in Waste
Action Project v. Dawn Mining Corp., 137 F.3d 1426, 28 ELR 21035 (9th
Cir. 1998), held radioactive source, byproduct and special nuclear materials
not to be pollutants, despite the specific listing of “radioactive materials” in
the CWA definition of “pollutant,” because those radioactive materials were
already regulated by the Atomic Energy Act, which Congress intended to be
the sole regulator of such materials.
66. “Materials” are listed in the plural. “Chemical wastes” is in the plural, but
the other categories of waste are in the singular. There is no apparent reason
why some of the categories are singular and others plural. None of the courts
interpreting pollutant found this difference to be significant nor do any of
them note that a party to the cases argued the difference was meaningful.
This may not be surprising because in the absence of a contrary indication
in the statute, the singular includes the plural and the plural includes the
singular. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 129-31, where the authors
trace this canon back to Blackstone and Bentham and a 1278 English case.
See also 1 U.S.C. §1, which provides that unless otherwise provided, singular nouns in the United States Code include the plural and vice versa.
67. For instance, hazardous materials regulated by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§5101 et seq., are more extensive, see
§5102(2) and §5103(a), than hazardous wastes regulated by RCRA, 42
U.S.C. §6903(5).
68. “Material” means “(1) the elements, constituents, or substances of which
something is composed or can be made (2) matter that has qualities which
give it individuality and by which it may be categorized.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 715 (10th ed.).
69. “Waste” means “damaged, defective, or superfluous material produced by a
manufacturing process: as . . . (3) an unwanted by-product of a manufactur-
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and material must be associated with human or industrial
activity to be a pollutant, using the ejusdem generis70 canon
of construction and noting that the substances listed in
the definition of pollutant were associated with human or
industrial activity.71 That analysis, however, is flawed, as
discussed below.72
Why does the definition of pollutant include all material of a biological nature, but only waste material of a solid,
chemical, industrial, municipal, or agricultural nature?
When do the latter materials become waste? Although the
case law does not directly address these questions under
the CWA, a few decisions examine whether particular
substances are solid waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),73 the statute primarily
designed to regulate the management and disposal of solid
and hazardous waste. Whether a substance is a solid waste
under RCRA has proven to be one of the most difficult
legal questions under that statute,74 suggesting the question
could be a difficult one under the CWA.

a.

Biological Materials

The term “biological material” raises dilemmas that courts
have addressed directly or indirectly. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit used plain meaning to hold
that fish parts and whole fish, dead or alive, were biological
material and therefore pollutants in National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co.75 There, an electric-generation
facility withdrew water with live whole fish from a lake,
ran the water through a turbine to produce electricity, and
discharged the water back into the lake with a puree of dead
fish parts, dead fish, and some live fish. A district court followed the Sixth Circuit’s lead, holding that a salmon farm
discharged pollutants, including live fish.76 Finally, in Asso-

70.

71.
72.
73.
74.

75.

76.

ing process, chemical laboratory or nuclear reactor . . . refuse from places of
human or animal habitation . . . Garbage: Rubbish (2) Excrement . . . Sewage.” Id. at 1329. See Northern Plains Research Council, 325 F.3d at 1161.
The ejusdem generis canon has been defined in a treatise as “[i]nterpret[ing]
a general term to reflect the class of objects reflected in the more specific
terms accompanying it.” See William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 323 (1987).
Association to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res.,
Inc., 299 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
For instance, while some sand and rock, listed as pollutants, may be associated with human activity, most are not.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§69016992k, ELR Stat. RCRA §§1001-11011.
RCRA defines “solid waste” in 42 U.S.C. §6904; EPA elaborates the definition in 40 C.F.R. §261.2. Under RCRA, hazardous waste is a subset of
solid waste. Determining whether material is a solid waste is often the most
difficult legal issue under RCRA, primarily because one person’s waste is
often another person’s raw material. See Jeffrey G. Miller & Craig N.
Johnston, The Law of Hazardous Waste Disposal and Remediation
149-71 (2d ed.). RCRA also regulates the disposal of nonhazardous solid
waste, but not as comprehensively as hazardous waste.
National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583, 19
ELR 20235 (6th Cir. 1988). The Sixth Circuit had earlier held oil to be a
pollutant, although by a more circuitous route because oil is a biological
material, perhaps hoping to avoid the question of whether fish and people
are pollutants under the CWA. United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 7
ELR 20253 (6th Cir. 1977).
U.S. PIRG v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239, 246-48,
32 ELR 20535 (D. Me. 2002).
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ciation to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Taylor Resources, Inc.,77 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found “biological material” to be ambiguous, possibly meaning all biological material or just biological waste
resulting from human or industrial activity. It held that
mussel shells and feces from a mussel-harvesting operation
were not pollutants because one purpose of the CWA was
the propagation of shellfish.78 Although the reasoning of
Hammersley is flawed, as discussed immediately below, the
three decisions can perhaps be reconciled if the lake fish in
Consumers Power were indigenous, the salmon in Atlantic
Salmon were not indigenous, and the origin of the mussels in Hammersley was ambiguous. Such a reconciliation of
the decisions would serve the statutory purpose of providing a “balanced, indigenous population of fish, shellfish and
wildlife,”79 although none of the courts made this distinction or suggested any other reconciliation. Giving meaning
to the distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous
species, however, would raise the subsidiary question of
how long species must be in place to be indigenous.
In Hammersley the court held mussel shells and feces
from a mussel-harvesting operation were not pollutants,
even though they were biological material, because to be
a pollutant, a substance must be a waste from a human or
industrial activity. It came to that conclusion using two
interpretive devices: ejusdem generis and avoiding absurd
results.80 Ejusdem generis posits that if a statute lists examples of regulated substances, other substances must be
of the same nature as the listed substances to be regulated by the statute. The court observed that the examples
listed in the definition of “pollutant” were all wastes from
human or industrial activity and that the mussel shells
and feces were not, hence the shells and feces could not
be “pollutants.”
The court was wrong on several counts. First, the statutory definition listed “biological material,” not “biological
waste.” As discussed above, “material,” of course, is different from and extends beyond “waste.” Congress’ use of both
material and waste in its list of substance categories that are
pollutants suggests that it knew the difference between the
words and intended different results by using them. Second, all of the other substances listed are not waste from
human activity. Rock and sand are listed, and while they
may be waste from human activity, most often they are not.
In any event, the relation to human activity need not be
reflected in the nature of a pollutant, because it is already
captured in the clause “by any person” in §301(a). Third,
although mussel shells and feces are not man-made, their
presence in large quantities at the harvesting operation was
man-induced. Indeed, the term used by the court for the
defendant’s activity, “harvesting operation,” is significant,
for the mussels did not grow of their own accord on the
operation’s equipment, instead the defendant planted their
77.
78.
79.
80.

299 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1015-17.
CWA §316(a), 33 U.S.C. §1326(a) (emphasis added).
Hammersley, 299 F.3d at 1016.
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seeds there; the operation included both production and
harvesting.81 Finally, Congress made it clear in §31882 that
discharges from aquacultural activities are subject to control by §402 permits, just as are discharges from concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs).83 Both of those
operations are very similar to growing and harvesting mussels in a confined area. Because the CWA does not define
“aquaculture,” a defendant might argue that it means only
raising fish, not shellfish. But the dictionary definition of
the word is the “culture of sea, lake and river foodstuffs, as
fish, oysters, seaweed, etc.”84 Moreover, the CWA considers
protection of fish and shellfish in the same phrases.85
The Ninth Circuit’s “absurd results” reasoning in Hammersley may appear to be more difficult to dismiss. The
court noted that the purpose of the CWA is to “provide for
the . . . propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife.”86 The
defendant’s activity included propagation of shellfish, a goal
that the CWA specifically espouses rather than an activity that the CWA specifically prohibits or regulates. But
the CWA translates the goal elsewhere as “the propagation
of a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, fish and
wildlife.”87 Under the facts of the case, the mussels probably
are not indigenous and the defendant’s activities, therefore,
may interfere with a balanced population of shellfish and
fish.88 The distinction is not necessary, however, because
Congress made it clear in §318 that aquacultural activities are subject to regulation by §402 permits, overcoming any contrary inferences from the goals of the statute.
The applicable canon of interpretation is that the specific
(§318’s specification that aquacultural activities must have
§402 permits) governs over the general (§101(a)’s policy of
providing for the propagation of fish and shellfish).
Under the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Consumers Power,
a state fish hatchery would need a §402 permit to stock
the state’s streams with native trout. Surely, Congress did
not intend that result. Perhaps, this is a perfect dilemma
for EPA to resolve by amending its definition of pollutant
to exclude indigenous live fish or by issuing a general permit authorizing federal and state fish and game authorities
to add hatchery-raised indigenous fish stock to navigable
water. While the Agency is rulemaking on fish and shell81. The operation was conducted from a raft and consisted of planting mussel
seeds on ropes hung from the bottom of the raft and anchored on the bottom. Mussels grew on the ropes, which were hoisted on board the raft at
intervals for harvesting. Hammersley, 299 F.3d at 1016.
82. 33 U.S.C. §1328. See 40 C.F.R. §122.24(a). EPA may designate aquaculture operations as point sources requiring permits.
83. Section 502(6) includes CAFOs within the list of example point sources.
84. See Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of the English Language 135
(1958). “The science, art and business of cultivating marine or freshwater
foodfish or shellfish, such as oysters, clams, salmon and trout, under controlled conditions.” See American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 89 (4th ed.).
85. CWA §§101(a) & 316(a), 33 U.S.C. §§1251(a) & 1326(a).
86. CWA §101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(2).
87. CWA §316(a), 33 U.S.C. §1326(a) (emphasis added). Although this language is specified for the control of thermal discharges, it is an apt amplification of the statutory goal and there is no reason to believe Congress’ concern
for indigenous fish was confined to their survival from changes in heat.
88. Association to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res.,
Inc., 299 F.3d 1007, 1010 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002).
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fish, it might as well include people so that water theme
parks do not need §402 permits for waterslides into lakes
and rivers. EPA already has promulgated a permit by rule
for burial at sea under the Ocean Dumping Act, demonstrating that it is possible to acknowledge that human bodies are pollutants, but allowing a desirable body-disposal
activity to continue under conditions that will ensure that
it is not harmful to human health or the environment.89 If
EPA can do so for human bodies under the Ocean Dumping Act, surely it can do so for live fish and human swimmers under the CWA. EPA might be tempted instead to
promulgate an exclusion from requiring a permit in 40
C.F.R. §122.3 for the same activity. This is not as wise a
course as the other options, however, because, as discussed
below, courts have repeatedly held that EPA does not have
the power to exempt from the permit program any discharges that the statute requires to have a permit.

b.

Consumer Products

One of the most frequently litigated issues in the interpretation of pollutant is whether a consumer product becomes
a waste when it is used for its intended purpose.90 The question arises because a product’s intended use may bring it to
rest in navigable water without further human intervention. Most products become waste when we throw them
away after use (for example, when we throw paper into the
waste basket or leave our garbage cans on the street for
municipal collection), or abandon them after use or even
before use (for example, when we spill unused oil from a
vessel at sea). But some products, such as bullets or pesticides, come to rest in navigable water because we use them
for their intended purposes. Does firing a bullet at a duck
flying over water constitute the addition of a solid or chemical waste to that water when we do not hit the bird? How
can firing a bullet at a bird, the intended use of the bullet, constitute disposal of a waste or addition of a waste to
water? Courts have held that substances can be pollutants
no matter how useful they are,91 and that the purpose of a
substance is irrelevant to whether it is a pollutant.92
The Supreme Court addressed a similar question under
the Refuse Act, holding in United States v. Standard Oil
Co. that commercially valuable aviation fuel became
refuse,93 indeed became a pollutant,94 once it was spilled
into water. Oil and hazardous substance spill cases under
the CWA generally involve this same principle because
89. Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§1401 et seq.
For Ocean Dumping Act, see §1412. EPA’s regulations, 40 C.F.R. §229.1,
authorize burial at sea of bodies, cremated ashes, and accompanying flowers
and decomposable wreathes, subject to conditions on location.
90. The same issue arises under RCRA.
91. See, e.g., Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp.
1088, 1101, 21 ELR 20467 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
92. See, e.g., Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 62627, 9 ELR 20334 (8th Cir. 1979).
93. “There is nothing more deserving of the label ‘refuse’ than oil spilled into a
river.” United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1966).
94. “The word ‘refuse’ includes all . . . pollutants apart from those flowing from
streets and sewers and passing there-from in a liquid state.” Id. at 230.
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commercially valuable oil or chemicals are abandoned
when they are spilled and are no longer useful products.95
Once a bullet misses the waterfowl it was aimed at and falls
into the water, it too becomes refuse. Neither the owner of
the spilled oil nor of the errant bullet intended to throw it
away or intended it to enter water. But by the very act of
spilling the substance in water or firing it over water, the
substance lost its value, and the owner abandoned it to fall
into water.96

i.

Munitions

The Supreme Court acknowledged that a bomb dropped
into ocean water when it missed its target on a practice
range was a pollutant because the definition of pollutant
includes “munitions,” and bombs are “munitions.”97 The
first cases in the civilian arena in which this issue surfaced were suits by environmental groups under the CWA
and RCRA against gun ranges for discharging spent lead
shot and skeet target fragments into Long Island Sound
and other water bodies.98 The plaintiffs challenged these
operations, in part, on the ground that the defendants were
point sources adding pollutants to navigable water without a CWA permit. The amounts of lead some gun ranges
added to the environment were enormous.99
Courts had no trouble finding that the spent shot “which
lands in navigable waters constitutes a pollutant within the
meaning of the CWA,”100 effectively meaning that it fell
within the chemical or solid waste categories in the CWA’s
definition of pollutant. Courts had considerably more
trouble determining whether the spent shot was a solid
waste under RCRA,101 an elaborately defined term under
95. See, e.g., United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir.
1977).
96. The analogy is not exact, however, for the spilled oil was never used for its
intended purpose, while the bullet may have been used for its intended
purpose, if the intended purpose was to be fired at a bird and to hit a bird
over or near water.
97. Weinberger v. Barcelo-Romero, 456 U.S. 305, 308-09, 12 ELR 20538
(1982). The Court describes the district court’s holding that bombs are pollutants because bombs are munitions, and munitions are included on the
exclusive list of pollutants in CWA §502(6). The Court did not question
that holding.
98. Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d
1305, 1313, 23 ELR 20699 (2d Cir. 1993); Long Island Soundkeeper
Fund, Inc. v. New York Athletic Club, 1996 WL 131863 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
99. For instance, at one gun range, 2,400 tons (nearly five million pounds) of
lead shot had been discharged on surrounding land and water. Connecticut
Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1308.
100. Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, 1996 WL 131863 at *15.
101. RCRA defines “hazardous waste” as a subset of “solid waste,” 42 U.S.C.
§6903(5). It then defines “solid waste” as “discarded material,” 42 U.S.C.
§6903(27), but it also charges EPA with the responsibility to define hazardous waste, which carries with it the responsibility to define solid waste, 42
U.S.C. §6921. EPA’s regulatory definitions of solid and hazardous waste are
narrower than the statutory definitions. In Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s
Ass’n, 989 F.2d 1305, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that lead shot fired at a rifle range met RCRA’s congressional definition of
solid waste, leaving open the question of whether it met EPA’s regulatory
definition. The significance between the different statutory and regulatory
definitions is that material must meet the statutory rather than the narrower regulatory definition of solid waste to provide courts with jurisdiction
for citizen suits seeking to remediate imminent and substantial endangerment of health or the environment from solid or hazardous waste under 42
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that statute. Neither RCRA’s statutory definition nor EPA’s
regulatory definition of solid waste under RCRA specifically addressed whether lead shot fired at a rifle range was
or became a solid waste. But EPA consistently interpreted
its RCRA regulatory definition of solid waste to exclude
consumer products when used for their intended purposes
and particularly to exclude spent ammunition.102 Indeed,
it promulgated a RCRA rule to define when spent military
munitions are and are not solid waste, specifying that they
are not solid waste when they are “used for their intended
purpose.”103 It could be argued that because the RCRA
regulation addresses only military munitions and not civilian munitions, spent civilian munitions are still pollutants.
The logic of the regulation, however, applies equally to military and civilian spent munitions.104 Should solid waste be
defined identically under RCRA and the CWA? Because
their goals are both to protect public health and the environment, arguably they should be, but that would require
EPA rulemaking under the CWA.

ii.

Pesticides

The issue of whether consumer products used for their
intended purposes are wastes when discharged into water
arises in other contexts, particularly with regard to the
application of pesticides in or near an aquatic environment. Decisions involving such releases are complicated
by the relevance of another statute administered by EPA,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA),105 governing the registration and use of pesticides
(insecticides, fungicides, or rodenticides). To register a pesticide, EPA must approve uses that can be made of the pesticide and directions for applying the pesticide; thereafter,
both are required to be printed on the label.106 In deciding
whether to register a pesticide, what uses to allow for it,
and what methods of application to require for it, EPA is to
“prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,”
including water.107 FIFRA prohibits the distribution, sale,
or use of an unregistered pesticide or the use of a registered
pesticide unless in compliance with EPA-approved uses
and directions for its application.
U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(B), but must meet the narrower regulatory definition
of solid waste to provide courts with jurisdiction for citizen suits against
disposal of hazardous waste without or in violation of a RCRA permit under
42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(A). The court later decided in Cordiano v. Metacom
Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009), that such lead shot was not a
RCRA solid waste within EPA’s regulatory definition. The end result is that
plaintiffs may bring citizen suits against gun clubs for causing an imminent
and substantial endangerment of health or the environment, regardless of
whether they are violating RCRA, but not against the gun clubs for operating without or in violation of a RCRA permit.
102. Cordiano, 575 F.3d at 207-09.
103. 40 C.F.R. §266.202.
104. Why did EPA not cover both military and civilian munition in the same
rule? Could it be that the U.S. Department of Defense’s lobbying carries
greater weight than the NRA’s lobbying?
105. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§136-136y, ELR Stat. FIFRA §§2-35.
106. FIFRA §3(c)(1)(C), 7 U.S.C. §136a(c)(C).
107. FIFRA §§2(j) & 3(a), 7 U.S.C. §§136(j) & 136a(a).
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When public health officials in and around New York
City discovered in 2000 that mosquitoes carried the newly
arrived and deadly West Nile virus, they ordered the spraying of pesticides to eradicate mosquitoes. Because mosquitoes breed in water, the resulting campaign sprayed
pesticides over and near open water and wetlands. In No
Spray Coalition v. City of New York,108 environmental
groups brought a CWA citizen suit to enjoin the spraying, arguing that it would damage the environmental
and public health, but would be ineffective in suppressing
West Nile virus. The district court, apparently irked by the
plaintiff’s attempt to interfere with the implementation of
public health protection measures,109 refused to issue an
injunction, in part because Congress did not intend plaintiffs to use the CWA citizen suit provision to enforce prohibitions of FIFRA, which had no such provision. Although
the court did not address whether pesticides, when properly applied to water according to the approved uses and
labels, were pollutants, it held that because the pesticides
were sprayed into the air rather than into the water, they
were not added to navigable water.110
Shortly thereafter, citizens filed similar suits against
nearby spraying. In Altman v. City of Amherst,111 the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that “pesticides, when used for their intended purpose, do not
constitute a ‘pollutant’ . . . and are more appropriately
regulated under FIFRA.”112 The court was persuaded that
because FIFRA had no citizen suit provision, Congress did
not intend that CWA citizen suits be brought against the
spraying of pesticides in accordance with label instructions
approved by EPA under FIFRA. In Peconic Baykeepers,
Inc. v. Suffolk County,113 another New York federal district
court conflated “addition” and “pollutant,” stating that:
“Atmospheric emission of aerial adulticides are not defined
as pollutants[;] at no time was the spray made directly to
navigable water.” It held that FIFRA rather than the CWA
governed and deferred to EPA’s Interpretive Statement (discussed below) that no CWA permit was required.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed No Spray, holding that CWA §505 authorized
plaintiffs to maintain a CWA citizen suit if they alleged
a violation of the CWA.114 The Second Circuit also
reversed Altman, because the record was incomplete and
because the plaintiff had not been able to conduct discovery to make its case that properly applied pesticides
were pollutants. The Second Circuit stated that the ques108. No Spray Coalition v. City of New York, 2000 WL 1401458 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), rev’d, 252 F.3d 148, 31 ELR 20707 (2d Cir. 2001).
109. The district court noted that the citizens filed suit “despite the unusual unanimity of governmental agency opinion that this spraying is in the best interests of preserving public health” and that “[f ]ortunately for the community, that question is decided by public health and environmental officials,”
not by the courts. 2000 WL 1401458 at *1.
110. Id. at *3.
111. Altman v. City of Amherst, 190 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d, 47
Fed. Appx. 52 (2d Cir. 2002).
112. Altman, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
113. 585 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 180 (2d Cir.
2010).
114. No Spray Coalition, 252 F.3d 148.
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tion of whether properly applied pesticides could be pollutants under the CWA would remain open unless and
until EPA articulated an interpretation of the CWA on
the issue.115 Finally, the Second Circuit in part reversed
Peconic Baykeepers,116 noting that the Sixth Circuit had
subsequently overturned EPA’s CWA pesticide exemption
rule in National Cotton Council,117 discussed below, but
that the Sixth Circuit had stayed its mandate. Because, on
the facts found by the district court, some of the defendant’s spraying was not in conformity with the pesticide’s
FIFRA-approved label, the Second Circuit reversed the
lower court’s decision to that extent.
In the meantime, two decisions of the Ninth Circuit
addressed the relationship between the CWA and FIFRA
in regulating the application of pesticides to navigable
water in accordance with their EPA-approved labels. In
Headwaters,118 decided in 2001, an irrigation district added
a chemically derived herbicide to irrigation canals (considered navigable waters for the purposes of the case) to kill
aquatic weeds choking the canals. EPA had registered the
herbicide under FIFRA for that purpose, and the defendant applied the herbicide in accordance with the instructions on its EPA-approved label. When the defendant
added the herbicide to the stream, the active ingredient
in the herbicide remained in the water after it had served
its intended purpose. The court held that the remaining
pesticide was either excess pesticide or pesticide residue, in
either case a “chemical waste,” and therefore a “pollutant,”
the discharge of which required a §402 permit.
In a later Ninth Circuit decision, Fairhurst v. Hagener,119
the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks had
added a pesticide to streams to kill invasive non-indigenous
fish for the purpose of restoring the population of indigenous fish. EPA had registered the chemically derived pesticide under FIFRA for that purpose, and Montana applied
the pesticide in accordance with the EPA-approved label.
As unlikely as it may seem, the uncontested facts established that no excess chemical pesticide was discharged
to the water and that once the pesticide performed its
intended purpose, there was no residue chemical pesticide
and hence no chemical waste. At the time that the Ninth
Circuit considered the issue, EPA had issued an Interpretive Statement and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the
Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States
in Compliance With FIFRA.120 Under EPA’s interpretation, pesticides applied for their intended purposes, in
accordance with their EPA-approved labels, and leaving no
excess or residue pesticide in the water, were not pollutants
under the CWA. This was consistent with the Headwaters
ruling, and the Ninth Circuit deferred to EPA’s interpreta115. Altman v. City of Amherst, 47 Fed. Appx. 52 (2d Cir. 2002).
116. Peconic Baykeepers, Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty., 600 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2010).
117. 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009).
118. 243 F.3d 526, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir. 2001).
119. 422 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2005).
120. Id. at 1149-50. Indeed, before the district court issued its opinion, EPA had
issued an Interim Interpretive Statement. The Interim Interpretive Statement and the Interpretive Statement were similar in reasoning and conclusion. Both are addressed below.
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tion. EPA’s interpretation conceded that excess pesticides
or residual pesticides are pollutants, but concluded they
are not added to navigable waters by aerial spraying point
sources because the point sources spray them into the air,
not into the water. The Ninth Circuit did not address this
spraying scenario, however, because it was beyond the facts
of the case.
EPA ultimately promulgated a CWA rule incorporating the substance and reasoning of its Interpretive Statement.121 The rule exempted from the CWA §402 permit
program pesticides applied directly to, over, or near
water in full compliance with FIFRA.122 The Sixth Circuit resolved challenges to the rule in the most detailed
decision considering the legality of discharging pesticides
into water without a CWA permit in National Cotton.123
EPA began its argument before the court, as it had in the
preamble to its rule, by stating that pesticides are either
biological or chemical in composition and can be pollutants only if they are “biological material” or “chemical
wastes.” It then argued that when chemically derived pesticides are applied for an EPA-approved use, they are not
chemical wastes. EPA conceded that excess pesticides and
pesticide residue are pollutants because they are biological
material or chemical wastes. Finally, it argued that biologically derived pesticides applied for their EPA-approved use
cannot be biological material, because it would be absurd
for biological pesticides applied for their approved use to
be treated differently than chemical pesticides applied for
their approved use.124
The Sixth Circuit considered three different dictionary
definitions of waste, and concluded that under any of the
definitions, chemical pesticides are not chemical waste, but
that excess pesticides and pesticide residue “are wastes of
the pesticide application.”125 Thus far, it agreed with EPA.
But then EPA argued that the point sources only sprayed
pesticides into the air for their intended uses; the point
source did not spray excess pesticides or pesticide residues.
At the “time of discharge, the pesticide is a non-pollutant
and the excess pesticide or pesticide residues are not created until later, presumably after they are already in the
water.”126 Therefore, EPA argued that by spraying pesticides, the point source did not spray (add) excess pesticides
and pesticide residues into water, and thus did not require
a CWA §402 permit. The court rejected EPA’s assertion
that “a pesticide must be ‘excess’ or ‘residue’ at the time of
discharge if it is to be considered as discharged from a point
121. 71 Fed. Reg. 68483 (Nov. 27, 2006), codified at 40 C.F.R. §122.3(h).
122. Id. at 68486-87. The rule was consistent with Fairhurst, in which the Ninth
Circuit had held that a chemical pesticide applied to water was not a pollutant when no excess or residual pesticide remained in the water. The rule
is not convincingly consistent with Headwaters, however, because that decision commented that chemical pesticide excess or residue in water would be
a pollutant without considering EPA’s argument that the defendant did not
add the pollutant from a point source.
123. National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR
20006 (6th Cir. 2009).
124. Id. at 934-35.
125. Id. at 936, quoting from the preamble of EPA’s rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68487.
126. Id. at 939.
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source.”127 The court found that requiring a temporal connection in “the discharge of a pollutant” was “unsupported
by the Act . . . [and] contrary to the purpose of the permitting program, which is ‘to prevent harmful discharges.’”128
The court noted that the purpose of the statute was to
prevent the discharge of pollutants that would harm water
quality, whether the harm occurred immediately upon discharge or later.129
As to biologically based pesticides, the court could find
no rationale for holding them not to be “biological materials” rather than falling into a more limited hypothetical
category such as “biological waste.” Congress specifically
used the broader “material” category for biological substances. Treating biological pesticides as pollutants is also
consistent with the §502(19) definition of pollution, which
includes the “biological . . . integrity of water,” for “[a]
dding biological pesticides to water undeniably alters its
biological integrity.”130 Since Congress decoupled “pollutant” from “pollution,” however, this is not overwhelmingly
persuasive support for the court. Alternatively, it could
have argued the broader interpretation of biological material promotes the objective of the CWA as stated in §101(a)
“to restore and maintain the . . . biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.” The court also noted that other courts
had construed “biological material” broadly to include live
fish, dead fish, fish parts, and fish feces and urine.131 In
the end, the court held that pesticide residue or excess was
unambiguously chemical waste and biological material.132

iii. Water Supply Treatment Residue
Lead shot and pesticides are not the only consumer products that may become pollutants after use for their intended
purposes. In Hudson River Fishermen’s Association v. City of
New York,133 the city augmented its water supply in times
of water shortage by pumping water from the Hudson
River into an aqueduct, which ultimately discharged the
water into a reservoir that was part of the city’s water supply system. The city conceded that the reservoir was navigable water. Because the river water was not clean enough
to serve as drinking water without treatment, the city
added alum and chlorine at the pumping station to precipitate out solids and to kill pathogens as the water made
127. Id.
128. National Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 939, quoting National Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2525 (2007).
129. A similar attempt to require a temporal connection between “addition” and
polluting activities was rejected in American Mining Cong. v. U.S. EPA, 965
F.2d 759, 764, 22 ELR 21135 (9th Cir. 1992).
130. National Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 938.
131. Citing National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 17
ELR 20801 (W.D. Mich. 1987); U.S. PIRG v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine,
LLC, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239, 246, 32 ELR 20535 (D. Me. 2002). The Sixth
Circuit distinguished Hammersley, holding mussel feces and shells not to
be biological material because that decision dealt with the “result of natural
biological processes, not the result of a transforming human process. See
National Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 938 n.6.
132. National Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 940.
133. 751 F. Supp. 1088, 21 ELR 20647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d without opinion,
940 F.2d 649, 21 ELR 21226 (2d Cir. 1991).
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its way to the reservoir through the aqueduct. By the time
the aqueduct discharged the river water to the reservoir,
the chemicals had performed their intended purposes and
the aqueduct discharged alum floc (the solids precipitated
by the alum) and chlorine residual (the chlorine remaining
after killing the pathogens) to the reservoir, along with the
treated water. The environmental group sued the city for
discharging alum floc and chlorine residue to the reservoir
without a permit.
The city argued it was adding useful chemicals at the
pumping station to perform a public health benefit, as the
defendants had argued in the pesticide application cases.
The district court found that the city’s actions were no different than those of other water treatment plants, which
commonly added alum to precipitate out solids, which they
then “filtered out, backwashed from the filter, and disposed
of as waste.”134 Indeed, water treatment plants routinely
have CWA §402 permits limiting their discharges of solids
and alum.135 Chlorine is used to treat publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) effluent for pathogens, and chlorine
residual is routinely regulated in CWA §402 permits for
POTWs.136
The city’s argument focused on the wrong substances
and the wrong receiving water. The city added alum and
chlorine to the water in the aqueduct at the pumping station, at which point they were useful products rather than
chemical wastes or residues. Moreover, no one contended
that the water in the aqueduct was navigable. But that was
not what the plaintiff environmental group challenged;
instead, it challenged the subsequent discharge of the
alum sludge and chlorine residual into the reservoir. At
that point, the reservoir was concededly navigable water
and the chemicals had served their useful purposes and
were either excess or residue—chemical wastes in either
case. The court commented that it “is indisputable that a
pollutant is a pollutant no matter how useful it may earlier
have been.”137

iv. Consumer Products as Pollution
Some may wonder why EPA would abandon the environmental high road by not regulating the discharges of
spent lead shot and spent or excess pesticides into water.
Cynics might conclude that EPA did not want to confront
the National Rifle Association and the agricultural lobby.
There is undoubtedly some truth in that. On the other
hand, it is not clear that Congress intended the CWA to
regulate additions to water of consumer products whose
intended use involves addition to water. This ambiguity
134. Id. at 1102.
135. Id. at 1097-98.
136. Interestingly, residual chlorine is limited in terms of both maximum levels
and minimum levels in POTW effluent. See Russian River Watershed Prot.
Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa, 142 F.3d 1136, 1139, 28 ELR 21265 (9th Cir.
1998). The maximum level, of course, protects life in the receiving water.
The minimum level ensures that the POTW is adding enough chlorine to
do its job.
137. Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 21
ELR 20647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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also troubles the analyses of the discharges under other elements of the CWA offense.138
The meaning of waste is inherently uncertain for two
primary reasons. First, what may be waste to a person
who is disposing of a substance may be a useful substance
for another person,139 an issue that has not yet arisen in
the decisions defining pollutant in the CWA, but underlies the issue of defining solid waste in RCRA. Second,
the intended use of a consumer product may result in the
product coming to rest in water, for example, spent bullets
fired at birds over water but missing their targets. These
and similar cases can be expected to recur in other contexts. Under these circumstances, it is curious why EPA
has not promulgated a rule defining pollutant or waste to
exclude consumer products, particularly regulated consumer products that are used for their intended purposes,
or fashioned a general permit or permit by rule to authorize such discharges, as it has done for military munitions
under RCRA140 or burial at sea of human bodies under
another statute, as discussed above. Of course, the Agency
attempted to promulgate a rule exempting pesticide applications from requiring §402 permits. But early in the
CWA’s implementation, courts held that EPA could not
exempt any category of discharges of pollutants from point
sources to navigable waters from the requirement of securing a CWA permit.141 It is no surprise that EPA lost its bid
to promulgate a similar rule exempting discharges of pesticides from the requirement of securing CWA permits.142
EPA might be more successful using a different regulatory
strategy, as suggested above.

C.

Discharged Into Water

Under §502(6), the listed substances and listed categories
of substances are pollutants only if they are “discharged
into water.” But the §301(a) prohibition, elaborated by
138. For instance, what are the point sources: the rifle ranges or the rifle barrels? If the latter, is EPA to issue permits to all hunters or rifle owners for
them to fire over water? That would be a thankless and probably impossible
task. The analytical problem may be analogous to issues that arise under the
“addition” element of the offense, where, with respect to aerial spraying of
pesticides, the addition seems to be to the air rather than to the water. See
Miller, supra note 6. In U.S. EPA ex rel. McKeown v. Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey, 162 F. Supp. 2d 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the plaintiff
sued to abate pollution from tunnel toll booths. The court commented that
the pollutants at issue emanated from countless vehicle exhausts rather than
from the toll booths.
139. When you leave an unwanted chair at the curbside in front of your house
and it is taken by someone else for use, it was waste for a moment, but
not for long. One of RCRA’s objectives is to minimize the disposal of
waste by encouraging “recycling and reuse.” See 42 U.S.C. §6902(a)(6).
Material destined for recycling is waste to the disposer, but a useful material to the recycler.
140. 40 C.F.R. §266.202, a rule that has survived judicial review. See Military
Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 28 ELR 21350 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
141. See National Cotton Council of Am. v. U.S. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR
20006 (6th Cir. 2009); Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. EPA, 537 F.3d
1006, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2008); Northern Plains Resource Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003); NRDC
v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 8 ELR 20028 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. U.S. EPA, Nos. 08-CV-5606, -8430,
2014 WL 1284544 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014).
142. National Cotton Council, 553 F.3d 927.
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§502(12), already specifies that only the addition of a pollutant from a point source into navigable water is a violation. The “discharged into water” phrase in §502(6)
appears to be redundant with the “into . . . water” already
in §502(12), making the offense: the addition of a pollutant into water from a point source into navigable water.
This makes no sense. “Water” in “discharged into water”
is not modified by “navigable,” making “water” a more
expansive term, perhaps including groundwater. Accordingly, the offense would read as follows: the addition of a
pollutant into water, including groundwater, from a point
source into navigable water. That makes no sense either.
Section 502(16) defines the freestanding “discharge” to
include “discharge of a pollutant,” which is already defined
as addition of a pollutant into navigable water from a point
source in §502(12). That interpretation would make the
offense even more circular and nonsensical. Statutes are to
be interpreted to give every word a meaning143 and to avoid
redundancies.144 Avoiding the redundancy of “discharge”
and “water” in §502(6), however, results in circularity,
absurdity, and nonsense, which are to be avoided even
more than redundancy.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that Congress
included a similar redundancy in its definition of “point
source” to mean exclusively a “discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may
be discharged,” with an inclusive list of examples, including a pipe, §502(14). This, together with the “discharged
into water” phrase in §502(6) makes the offense read:
the addition of any listed substance into water from a
pipe from which listed substances are added into navigable waters. This suggests the offense is a two-staged
activity: the addition of a substance into water, and the
subsequent addition of their mixture by a conveyance
into navigable water. While that describes many industrial and municipal effluents, nothing else in the statute
suggests the prohibition excludes addition of pollutants
directly into navigable water without first being mixed
with water.
Perhaps, the drafters of these definitions did not want
to slander the substances listed as pollutants unless they
were actually added to navigable water. We do not want
children to recoil from eating broccoli because it is a “pollutant” (a “biological material”), regardless of whether it
is discharged into water. Similarly, perhaps the drafters
did not want to imply that all point sources were illegal
unless they actually added pollutants to navigable water.
Such caution was unnecessary, however, because all four
elements of the offense must be met before a discharge violates the CWA unless it is in compliance with a permit.
Although when interpreting a statute we are supposed to
avoid redundancy and to give meaning to every word, a few
143. Senne v. Village of Palentine, Ill., 695 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2012). See
Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 174-79.
144. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837
(1988). Eskridge, supra note 70, at 324, citing Kungys v. United States,
485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc.,
476 U.S. 498, 510 n.22 (1986).
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redundancies, meaningless words, and scrivener’s errors145
may be inevitable in a 200-page statute. These redundancies are two of them.
Only two decisions have identified this issue. In the
first, United States v. Pozsgai,146 the defendants in an
enforcement action for filling a wetland without a §404
permit argued that they had not discharged substances
into water and, therefore, the substances were not pollutants. They argued that the “into navigable waters” phrase
in §502(12) defined the geographic jurisdictional reach of
the statute, and the “into water” phrase in §502(6) limited the definition of “pollutant.” Though it seemed to be a
clever argument, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit rejected it in favor of reading “navigable waters”
in §502(12) to modify “water” in §502(6), an interpretation it found more consistent with the legislative history.147
The court’s interpretation, however, is circular and ignores
the recurrence of similar redundancies in these definitional
phrases.148 The second decision, Pronsolino,149 was a dispute
over whether §§303(d) and 319 require total maximum
daily loads (TMDLs) for water polluted only by nonpoint
sources. While the California federal district court recognized the issue posed by “into water” in the definition of
pollutant in §502(6), it did not need to address that issue
to resolve the TMDL dispute before it.
As much as courts abhor redundancy in statutes, there
is no apparent way around the redundancy between “into
navigable water” in §502(12), the primary definition of the
offense, and “into water” in §502(62), defining an element
in §502(12).

D.

Must a Pollutant Cause Pollution?

As discussed above, Congress decoupled “pollutant” and
“pollution” by defining each without reference or regard
to the other. The §502(6) definition of pollutant does not
hint that a pollutant is something causing pollution; the
§502(19) definition of pollution does not hint that pollution is a condition caused by a pollutant. Most courts
agree.150 Indeed, in an important early decision, National
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch,151 the D.C. Circuit deferred
to EPA’s argument that low dissolved oxygen, cold, and
oxygen supersaturation resulting from water flowing over
dams were not pollutants, but instead were “water condi145. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 234-39.
146. 999 F.2d 719, 23 ELR 21012 (3d Cir. 1993).
147. Id. at 726-27.
148. Section 502(12) similarly defines the “discharge of a pollutant” to mean addition of a pollutant from a “point source,” which it defines in §502(14) as
a conveyance from which a pollutant may be “discharged.”
149. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 30 ELR 20460 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
150. Demonstration of a negative impact on water quality is not necessary for a
substance to be a pollutant. See, e.g., Northern Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Dev. Co., 35 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305,
309, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir. 1993); Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v.
Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 626-27, 9 ELR 20334 (8th Cir. 1979); U.S. PIRG
v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239, 247 n.3, 32 ELR
20535 (D. Me. 2002); Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York
Athletic Club, 1996 WL 131863 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
151. 693 F.2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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tions,” e.g., “pollution,” and therefore the dams from which
these conditions followed did not require §402 permits.
Despite the decoupling of pollutant and pollution, some
courts have determined particular substances to be pollutants or not to be pollutants in part on the basis of their
negative impact or lack of negative impact on water quality.152 Because the overall purpose of the CWA is “to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”153 and the CWA’s definition of
pollution is the “man-made or man-induced alteration of
the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water,” the very purpose of the CWA, not surprisingly, is to reduce pollution. The frequently used canon of
construction to interpret a remedial statute to effectuate
its purpose,154 therefore, suggests that “pollutant” be interpreted to accomplish “pollution” control, even though the
two words are decoupled by their statutory definitions. On
the other hand, the definition of pollutant is so broad that
use of this additional canon should not be necessary to
hold that a substance is a pollutant. Moreover, while the
fact that a substance causes pollution might suggest that
the substance is a statutory pollutant,155 the reverse is not
true. After all, Congress defined pollutant to include substances not causing pollution, such as rock and sand.
One problem with using the concept of pollution as a
driver for interpreting pollutant is that the meaning of pollution is not altogether clear. While the statutory definition of pollution as the “chemical, physical, biological and
radiological integrity of water” appears meaningful, what
does it in fact mean? What is water integrity?156 Surely,
it cannot mean pure water, which scarcely if ever occurs
in a state of nature and would not nourish fish and shellfish if it did. Is water with integrity water as it existed at
a particular time and place? Before the industrial revolution? Before the arrival of European colonists in North
America? Before the arrival of the original colonists in the
western hemisphere?157 Or does it relate to “the protection
152. For decisions where a substance was deemed a pollutant because of negative
impact on water quality, see Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 261 F.3d 810, 814-15, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir. 2001); and
United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 336, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir. 2000).
In Hammersley, the Ninth Circuit held that a substance was not a pollutant
because of its neutral or positive impact on water quality. See Association to
Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Taylor Resources, Inc., 299
F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002).
153. CWA §101(a).
154. Eskridge, supra note 70, at 327, citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S.
56 (1990).
155. See National Cotton Council of Am. v. U.S. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 938, 39
ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009).
156. The dictionary definition of “integrity” is “unimpaired or unmarred state
. . . soundness, purity.” Webster’s New Dictionary of the English Language 1290 (1958). Use of the word in the CWA “is intended to convey a
concept that refers to a condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems is maintained.” H. Rep. No. 92-911, at 76-77 (1972),
reprinted in 3 Legis. History 753, 763-64. Query how much help that is.
Which ecosystem are we protecting? The one that existed before the advent
of the industrial revolution, or before the introduction of trans-Atlantic
human immigrants, or before the introduction of Native American immigrants, or before the last Ice Age? Ecosystems are constantly evolving even
without human intervention.
157. One case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit suggests
that water with integrity means pre-industrial revolution or even pre-human
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and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and . . . for
recreation in and on the water,” a goal of the CWA?158 If
so, which fish and shellfish?159 Indigenous or introduced? If
indigenous, at what time and for how long?
The concepts of water integrity and water pollution are
relative, difficult to define, and involve both science and
policy. Take, for example, nutrients. Nutrients support biological growth; without nutrients, there would be no fish
in the streams, lakes, or oceans. But a superabundance of
nutrients causes algae blooms, which in turn die and exert
oxygen demand in water to decompose, and if the oxygen
demand from the algae decomposition is sufficient, there
will be no oxygen left for fish to survive. There is a dead
zone in the Gulf of Mexico caused by nutrients flushed
down the Mississippi River from farmland, cities, and factories throughout the Midwest.160 No nutrients equates
to no fish; but too many nutrients also equates to no fish.
Whether a substance causes pollution is often a situational
issue and is always a scientific question. To be sure, there
are some substances that cause harm to health or the environment under any circumstances and therefore are pollutants under any circumstances. Examples include PCBs
or dioxin.
Congress dealt with the ambiguity of water integrity
by establishing the water quality standards regimen, in
which states designate the uses they desire to be made of
particular water bodies (a policy determination), and states
together with EPA establish the maximum levels or criteria for various pollutants allowed in each water body to
achieve the designated use (a scientific determination).161
Congress provided in the CWA that point sources cannot
discharge pollutants into a water body that will interfere
with the designated use of the water by causing an exceedance of the criteria for pollutants in the water body.162
Congress’ decoupling of “pollutant” and “pollution”
in the definitions of the two words reflects its recognition
that whether the discharge of a pollutant causes pollution
depends in part on a political judgment as to what use
should be made of a particular water body, and in part
on a scientific expert judgment as to the extent to which
discharges of pollutants must be curtailed to achieve that
use. These are the very determinations required to estabwater. See Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist.v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617,
625, 9 ELR 20334 (8th Cir. 1979). Self-evidently, the physical, chemical,
and biological composition of a pre-human river may be purely speculative.
158. CWA §101(a)(2).
159. Section 316(a), 33 U.S.C. §1326(a), may provide some help here by specifying that thermal discharges shall be limited to protect a “balanced, indigenous population of fish, shellfish and wildlife.” To be sure, indigenous
populations change over time.
160. Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d
1210, 1227 (11th Cir. 2009).
161. For a discussion of water quality standards and how they are implemented,
see Miller et al., supra note 5, at Chap. V.
162. Of course, limiting the pollution levels of point sources may not achieve
the criteria. In that situation, states may limit nonpoint source discharges to
achieve the criteria. If states refuse to do so, however, the CWA has reached
the limits of its effectiveness, for it authorizes no federal controls on nonpoint sources and no mechanisms to force states to act on them. For a discussion of the CWA’s limited nonpoint source program, see Miller et al.,
supra note 5, at Chap. XIII.
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lish water quality standards and effluent limitations based
on them. This was the pre-1972 strategy of federal water
pollution control. But Congress found the water quality
approach was cumbersome, resource-intensive for regulators, and slow. Congress therefore enacted the CWA
in 1972 to simplify and expedite regulation of pollution
through point sources by the initial substitution, in most
cases, of technology-based standard regulation for water
quality-based standard regulation.163 Congress hoped that
application of the best available water pollution control
technology to point sources would achieve water quality
standards in most waterways. But it required permit writers to establish effluent limitations requiring further treatment where necessary to achieve water quality standards.
Thus, for courts to ask whether a substance causes environmental harm before holding that it is a pollutant arrogates
to courts a task that Congress delegated to EPA and the
states,164 pushing judicial authority beyond its separationof-powers limits.
Why do some courts nevertheless continue to examine
whether substances cause pollution before finding they are
pollutants? Perhaps, because some judges think it unfair
to enmesh defendants in the pollution-control regulatory
system unless their discharges are actually harmful. If so,
these judges misperceive both the statutory process and
their role in it. Holding that a substance is a pollutant does
not enmesh the substance in the pollution-control system.
That occurs only if all of the other elements of §301(a) are
met. Moreover, holding that a substance is a pollutant does
not mean that it will be subject to pollution control even
if the other elements are met. Water quality standards do
not require treatment of harmless substances for which
no criteria exist. And the technology-based standards are
established, in part, based on a cost-benefit analysis or at
least a consideration of cost.165 If a substance does not cause
harm, the costs of treatment for its removal may not be justified.166 To be sure, someone must determine whether the
substance causes sufficient environmental harm to warrant
treatment costs. But that is a role that Congress assigned to
EPA and its counterpart state agencies, not to the courts.167
163. CWA §301(b). For a quick review of the events leading up to the enactment
of the CWA, see Environmental Prot. Agency v. California ex rel. State Water
Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203-06, 6 ELR 20563 (1976).
164. As the Eighth Circuit said in Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist.v. Hoffman,
597 F.2d 617, 627, 9 ELR 20334 (8th Cir. 1979):
Congress has, by the inclusion of certain substances in the definition of “pollutant” . . . determined that the discharge of those
substances in navigable waters is subject to the Act’s control requirements. The Act contains no provision that the listed substances are
to be classified as pollutants and, thus subject to the Act’s control
requirements, only upon a further administrative or judicial finding
that their addition to navigable waters results in a significant decrease in water quality. Nor does the fact that the listed substances
may not in themselves be commonly considered “toxic” or “contaminating” change this result.
165. CWA §304(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), & (b)(3)(B), 33 U.S.C. §1314(b)(1)(B),
(b)(2)(B), & (b)(3)(B).
166. See Miller et al., supra note 5, at 278-305.
167. An exception exists in judicial review of EPA’s promulgation of technologybased standards, approval of state water quality standards, or issuance of a
permit, where courts give substantial deference to EPA’s determinations.
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In conclusion, the plain meaning of the definition of
pollutant includes almost all substances that may be added
to water, making other interpretive devices unnecessary in
almost all cases. For the few substances for which the outcome is ambiguous, the broad general purpose of the CWA
to attain and maintain water integrity may be a useful
supplemental interpretive device in determining whether
an environmentally harmful material is a pollutant. If a
material does not cause pollution or interfere with water
integrity, however, it is still a pollutant if it fits within the
statutory definition.

E.

Must Pollutants Be of Human Origin?

The Ninth Circuit’s Hammersley decision held that pollutants must be wastes of human or industrial processes.
The notion that a pollutant must be a waste was discussed,
and dispelled, above. The notion that a pollutant must be
the product of human or industrial processes is similarly
wrong. The definition of pollutant contains no qualification that a substance be the product of human or industrial
activity. While the definition of “pollution” is limited to
“man-made or man-induced alteration” of water quality,168
pollution is not a jurisdictional limitation, and Congress
decoupled the definitions of pollutant and pollution. The
definitional list of pollutants includes substances that are
not man-made (for example, rock and sand), although
those substances may be added to navigable water as a
result of human activity. But it is not necessary to contort
the definition of pollutant to limit the CWA prohibition to
the results of human activity, because the offense already
includes “by any person” as a separate element. Insisting
that pollutant in §502(6) requires human activity merely
creates an unnecessary redundancy with the phrase “by
any person” in §301(a).

F.

Potential Conflicts With Other CWA Sections

The CWA authorizes regulatory programs other than
the §402 permit program. The §404 permit program for
dredged and fill material has already been mentioned and
is discussed immediately below in greater detail. Section
311169 provides a comprehensive program to prevent spills
of oil and hazardous materials, to remediate them when
they occur, and to recover the government’s spill cleanup
costs. The Oil Pollution Act,170 passed in the wake of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, has largely supplanted §311. Section
312 authorizes the U.S. Coast Guard to regulate the disposal of untreated or inadequately treated sewage from vessels into navigable waters. Nonpoint pollution sources are
regulated, if at all, by states, under their own authorities,
as encouraged by §319. For the most part, these other pro-

168. CWA §502(19).
169. 33 U.S.C. §1321.
170. Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C. §§2701-2761, ELR Stat. OPA
§§1001-7001.
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grams do not conflict with §402 or raise particular issues
with regard to the definition of pollutant.

1.

Section 311

In United States v. Hamel,171 the defendant appealed from
a criminal conviction for spilling gasoline into Lake St.
Claire in violation of §301(a), arguing that gasoline was not
a pollutant under §502(6) because that statutory section
did not list petroleum products. He further argued, applying the canon that a specific provision of a statute governs
over a general provision of the same statute,172 that because
§311 regulated oil spills and even defined “oil” in §311(a)
(1), oil was not a pollutant under §502(6) and oil spills
were not included as violations of §301(a). The government
argued, and the district court held, that oil and gasoline
fell within the category of “biological material” listed as a
pollutant in §502(6).173 The Sixth Circuit could easily have
upheld the conviction on that basis. Instead, it undertook a
longer but more specific analysis, finding that when Congress enacted the CWA, it intended to include within the
§402 permit program all discharges covered by the Refuse
Act plus liquid waste from streets and sewers,174 and that
the Supreme Court had held earlier, in United States v.
Standard Oil Co.,175 that oil spills were discharges of refuse
under the Refuse Act. Although those findings answered
both of the defendant’s arguments, the court proceeded to
demonstrate that there was no conflict between §§402 and
311 in this regard, because they served different purposes.
The purpose of the §402 permit program is to require pollution reduction from ongoing discharges of pollutants,
while the purpose of §311 is to prevent spills of pollutants
and to remediate them when they occur.176 The court could
have performed the same analysis, with the same result, if
§311 had been a different statute (for example, the OPA)
rather than a different section in the same statute.177

2.

Section 404: Dredged and Fill Material

Section 301(a) prohibits the discharge of a pollutant, except
in compliance with a §402 or §404 permit. Section 402
authorizes EPA to issue permits for the discharge of a
pollutant, and §404 authorizes the U.S. Army Corps of
171. 551 F.2d 107, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir. 1977).
172. See Eskridge, supra note 70, at 324, citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1989); Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at
183-89.
173. Hamel, 551 F.2d at 110.
174. Id. at 110-11.
175. 384 U.S. 492 (1966).
176. Hamel, 551 F.2d 111-13.
177. Why would the court have taken such a round-about path to its conclusion,
when it would have been far easier to hold that oil is a biological material,
a listed category of pollutant? It might be explained by the fact that the
decision was written during the heyday of using legislative history as an
interpretive device. Eskridge, supra note 70, at 207-38; Scalia & Garner,
supra note 12, at 369-90. See, e.g., Train v. Colorado PIRG, 426 U.S. 1, 6
ELR 20549 (1976). The court may also have been hesitant to start down the
biological material path, knowing full well that live fish and perhaps people
lay ahead as pollutants.
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Engineers (the Corps) to issue permits for the discharge of
“dredged or fill material.” Many, if not most, courts conclude from this that dredged or fill material is a pollutant,
in conclusory formulations such as that §301(a) “prohibits
the discharge of any pollutant, including dredged or fill
material.”178 A few courts mention §502(6) in support of
the conclusion. These decisions, however, are in part either
wrong or misleading. Section 301(a) does not define pollutant, much less define it to include dredged or fill material.
Section 502(6) defines pollutant to include “dredged spoil”;
it does not define pollutant to include either “dredged or
fill material” or “fill material.” The unstated reasoning of
these decisions may be that because §301(a) prohibits the
discharge of pollutants except in compliance with permits
issued under §402 or §404, and because §404 authorizes
the Corps to issue permits for the discharge of dredged or
fill material, then dredged or fill material must be a pollutant. This is circular reasoning. There would be no reason for dischargers of dredged or fill materials to apply for
§404 permits unless dredged or fill materials are pollutants,
because their discharges without permit are not otherwise
illegal under §301(a), §404, or any other provision of the
CWA. But for the absence of dredged or fill material from
the definition of pollutant in §502(6), the courts’ logic
might be persuasive. But because the definition in §502(6)
is exclusive, its failure to explicitly include “dredged or
fill material” means that such material is not a pollutant
unless it or its constituents are listed in the definition or
fall within a category of materials listed in the definition.
Fortunately, the §502(6) definition of pollutant
includes “dredged spoil,” a term practically synonymous
with “dredged material.”179 Although there is no hint of
“fill material” in the §502(6) definition, most fill material
consists at least in part of one of the specific substances
included in that definition (rock and sand), or a substance
that is within one of the categories included in that definition (demolition debris that falls within the solid, industrial or municipal waste categories).180 Assuming that fill
material is composed at least in part of pollutants, which
agency should issue a permit for the discharge: EPA for the
178. Bersani v. EPA, 850 F.2d 36, 39, 18 ELR 20874 (2d Cir. 1988). See also
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1391, 25 ELR 21046 (9th
Cir. 1995); Town of Norfolk v. Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1445, 22
ELR 21337 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing §502(6)); United States v. Brink, 795
F. Supp. 2d 565, 575 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Gouger v. Corps of Eng’rs, 779 F.
Supp. 2d 588, 603 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Alabama Rivers Alliance, Inc. v. Corps
of Eng’rs, 697 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1258 (N.D. Ala. 2009); D’Olive Bay Restoration and Preservation Committee, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs, 513 F. Supp.
2d 1261, 1268 (S.D. Ala. 2007); Florida Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (under §502(6)
“dredged or fill materials are pollutants”); City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth,
332 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1015 (S.D. Tex. 2004); National Wildlife Federation
v. Norton, 332 F. Supp. 2d 170, 185 (D.D.C. 2004). Contra, see Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927, 932, n.5
(S.D. W. Va. 2002), labeling this as circular reasoning, rev’d on other grounds,
317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003).
179. In United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 259, 28 ELR 20299 (4th Cir.
1997), the court commented that while “the statutory term ‘dredged spoil’
carries with it a more pejorative connotation than does the term the court
used [in its jury instructions], ‘dredged material,’ the two are not sufficiently
different to constitute error.”
180. United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 23 ELR 21012 (3d Cir. 1993).
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discharge of the included pollutants or the Corps for the
discharge of the fill material?181 The interpretive canon that
the specific statutory provision governs over the general
provision182 suggests that when a broadly defined pollutant
is also a narrowly defined “fill material,” then the more specific §404 governs, authorizing the Corps to issue a permit
for the discharge of the fill material, rather than authorizing EPA to issue a permit for the discharge of a pollutant
included in the fill material. Section 402(a) confirms this
by granting EPA authority to issue permits for the discharge of pollutants, “[e]xcept as provided in” §404. This
leaves the Corps as the agency issuing permits for the discharge of dredged and fill material, and EPA as the Agency
issuing permits for the discharge of all other pollutants.
That was the conclusion reached by courts considering
the matter, including the Supreme Court in Coeur Alaska,
Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council.183 In Coeur
Alaska, environmental petitioners sought judicial review
of a §404 permit authorizing the discharge of a slurry of
30% crushed rock and 70% water from a gold-mining
operation184 into a 23-acre lake that all parties agreed was
navigable water. The operation would allow the solids to
separate from the slurry by settling to the bottom of the
lake, eventually filling all of the natural lake and more
than doubling its surface. The operation would build a dam
across the outlet from the lake, preventing the slurry water
from flowing downstream without treatment. EPA issued
a §402 permit imposing effluent limitations requiring the
treatment of water flowing downstream from the dam. The
Corps issued a §404 permit to fill the lake. Environmental
petitioners contended that discharging pollutants into the
lake required a §402 permit, not a §404 permit. The Ninth
Circuit agreed, but the Supreme Court reversed.
Section 402 permits issued by EPA or states with
approved programs, and §404 permits issued by the Corps
or states with approved programs, are subject to very different conditions and limitations. Section 402 permits
impose limitations on the discharge of pollutants requiring
pollution reduction reflecting the application of the best
available treatment technology and meeting state-developed water quality standards. Section 404 permits do not
require pollution reduction, but may impose conditions on
authorized projects to protect the environment. The Corps
may also condition or deny permits when a public interest review determines that their negative environmental
impacts outweigh any social or economic benefit. Thus,
whether particular pollutants are “dredged or fill material”
181. Justice Stephen Breyer explores this issue in his concurring opinion in Coeur
Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 292-93
(2009) (Breyer, J., concurring).
182. Eskridge, supra note 70, at 324, citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1989); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc.,
482 U.S. 437 (1987); Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 183-89.
183. 557 U.S. 261 (2009). See also Resource Invs., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 151 F.3d 1162, 28 ELR 21407 (9th Cir. 1998); Greenfield Mills,
Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 946 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. United
Homes, Inc., 1999 WL 117701 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
184. The operation re-refined previously processed ore by crushing it and treating
it with a chemical bath to float and recover remaining gold.
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makes a tremendous difference in the viability of the operation producing the pollutants and the environmental protection afforded the receiving water. Covering streams and
filling valleys with mining overburden may be authorized
by a Corps §404 permit if the overburden is “fill material.”
But the same operation would probably be stymied if the
pollutants discharged to the streams first had to meet technology-based and water quality standards under an EPAissued §402 permit.185 In Coeur Alaska, for instance, if a
§402 permit was required, the particular mining operation
would have been subject to a new source performance standard of zero discharge of pollutants.186 Under the circumstances, however, the tailings pond technology on which
the standard was justified would have resulted in a greater
loss of wetlands and natural habitat.187
The CWA does not define dredged material. Although
CWA §502(6) defines pollutant to include dredged spoil,
the statute does not define dredged spoil. EPA and the
Corps both define dredged material to mean “material
that is excavated or dredged from the waters of the United
States.”188 As the concept of navigable waters expands to
include wetlands, the question arises whether digging in
a wetland requires a §404 permit. Because §404 requires
a permit for discharging dredged material into a wetland,
not for removing it from a wetland,189 however, those issues
revolve around whether particular movements of soil and
vegetation in wetlands during landclearing operations constitute addition.190
The CWA does not define fill material. EPA and the
Corps both define the term to mean “material placed in the
waters of the United States where the material has the effect
of: (i) Replacing any portion of a water body with dry land;
or (ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any portion of the
water of the United States.”191 The definitions give inclusive
examples of “rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction
debris, wood chips, overburden from mining or other excavation activities, and materials used to create any structure
or infrastructure in the waters of the United States.” Both
definitions specifically exclude “trash or garbage,” which
neither EPA nor the Corps defines. The Corps earlier
defined fill material to mean “any material used for the
primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land
of or changing the bottom elevation of a [ ] water body.”
That definition excluded pollutants discharged “primarily
to dispose of waste” (not just trash and garbage), an activity
it acknowledged was regulated under CWA §402.192 The
newer rule has the virtue of being objective rather than
depending on the discharger’s state of mind. However, the
newer definition creates a giant loophole allowing all sorts
185. See Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. 261; Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v.
Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003).
186. Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 266.
187. Id. at 269-70.
188. 33 C.F.R. §323.2(c) and 40 C.F.R. §232.2.
189. Save Our Community v. U.S. EPA, 971 F.2d 1995 (5th Cir. 2002); Orleans
Audubon Society v. Lee, 742 F.2d 901, 15 ELR 20030 (5th Cir. 1984).
190. For a discussion of the “addition” element, see Miller, supra note 6.
191. 33 C.F.R. §323.2(e) and 40 C.F.R. §232.2.
192. 42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37145 (July 19, 1977); 33 C.F.R. §323.2(m) (1978).
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of waste (excepting only trash and garbage) disposal into
water under the guise of filling the water or changing its
bottom elevation.193
While typical municipal and industrial wastewaters are
primarily liquid, they also have solid components that can
settle out on the bottom of the receiving water and change
its elevation, although that is more likely to occur in quiescent rather than in turbulent water. Indeed, in Rapanos
v. United States, the Supreme Court toyed with the idea
that liquid effluents are pollutants subject to §402 permits,
while solids are fill material subject to §404 permits.194 The
Court stated that “‘dredged or fill material’ . . . unlike traditional water pollution, are solids that do not readily wash
downstream.”195 The plaintiffs in Coeur Alaska argued that
this created a huge loophole in the CWA, and the Supreme
Court dissent agreed.196 Any industrial wastewater with
solids in it could be classified as “fill material” if the solids can accumulate on and eventually raise the level of the
water bottom. That could effectively remove large segments
of industry from the water pollution abatement requirements of the CWA §402 program.197 The argument was
weakened in Coeur Alaska, however, because EPA and the
Corps agreed that the fill project at issue was governed by
§404, and their regulations provided that mining overburden was fill material. Moreover, EPA and the Corps treated
the altered lake as a treatment facility by requiring a §402
permit at the outlet of the lake into a navigable river. The
Court majority acknowledged the potential loophole, but
left the question for another day, if and when EPA and the
Corps agreed that other, more obnoxious industrial waste
was fill material.198 In any event, the Court pointed out
that EPA could veto Corps permits under §404(c).
193. Neither the older nor the newer version of the definition deals comfortably
with the construction in a wetland of a sanitary landfill for the disposal of
municipal solid waste. Under either definition, the placement of trash and
garbage is excluded from fill material, so that a §402 permit rather than a
§404 permit would be required for the operation of the facility. But the construction of the bottom liners and leachate collection systems of the landfill
would seem to fit within the definition of fill material, requiring a §404
permit for its construction. Because construction of municipal landfilling
wetlands is directly regulated by Subtitle D of RCRA, however, the Ninth
Circuit has ruled that it is not regulated by CWA §404. See Resource Invs.,
Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 151 F.3d 1162, 28 ELR 21407 (9th Cir.
1998).
194. “[T]he deposit of mobile pollutants into upstream ephemeral channels
is naturally described as an ‘addition . . . to navigable waters,’ 33 U.S.C.
§1362(12), while the deposit of stationary fill material generally is not.”
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 745 n.11, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
195. Id. at 723.
196. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S.
261, 302-03 (2009).
197. EPA commonly regulates total suspended solids. See, e.g., best practicable
treatment technology for the Rayon Fibers Subcategory of the Organic
Chemicals, Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Effluent Guidelines, 40 C.F.R.
§414.21.
198. Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 275-76. The mining company in that case proposed to treat mining waste by turning a wilderness lake into a settling
basin. It applied to the Corps for a §404 permit to fill the lake and to EPA
for a §402 permit to discharge water from the lake to the stream originally
draining the lake. At the termination of mining activity, the company would
restore the lake. The alternative was to build a settlement basin of considerable height and extent that would not have to be deconstructed at the
termination of operations. EPA, the Corps, and the Supreme Court majority seemed to think the proposal was the better alternative. Id. at 269-70.
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The distinction between whether material discharged to
water is subject to a §402 or a §404 permit is easy in most
cases. The discharge of effluent containing pollutants, such
as PCBs, is regulated under §402 because the main impact
of the discharge is on public health and water quality. The
discharge of soil to extend a building lot into a river is regulated under §404 because its impact is on the navigability
of the river. However, if the PCBs are attached to solids in a
liquid effluent, under the current regulatory definition, the
discharge is arguably regulated under §404, because if the
solids accumulate, they can change the bottom elevation
of the receiving water. Treating toxic solids as fill material
subject to a §404 permit, however, ignores the differences
between the purposes and operations of the two sections.
The confusion may be the inevitable consequence of mixing water pollution control regulation with water projects
regulation, but EPA and the Corps could eliminate confusion and ambiguity by a more careful phrasing of their
regulations. Indeed, EPA and the Corps should return to
their earlier regulatory definitions of fill material, because
those earlier definitions better track differences between
the intended purposes of §402 and §404.

G.

Potential Conflicts With Other Statutes

Special care is needed to interpret a statute in cases where
another statute may apply to the same fact pattern, especially if an interpretation of one statute may interfere with
achieving the purposes of the other statute. In these cases,
common wisdom cautions to read the statutes harmoniously with each other, and certainly canons of statutory
construction require a harmonious reading.199 Pollution
control statutes create this type of problem because they
normally protect a single environmental medium (air, land,
or water) from contamination, whereas pollutants tend to
migrate between environmental media. For instance, a
power plant’s air pollution, which is regulated by the Clean
Air Act (CAA),200 not only fouls the air, but may also be
redeposited by gravity or precipitation onto land or water.
Indeed, air emissions from coal-burning power plants have
long been known as the primary sources of acid deposition in the northeastern United States and neighboring
Canada, causing both acid rain and acid runoff into lakes
and other surface water.201 Air pollution from such sources
It goes without saying that the best environmental alternative would have
been to have neither the settlement basin nor the flooded lake.
199. Statutes are to be interpreted in pari materia to avoid conflicts. See Eskridge, supra note 70, at 327, citing Morales v. TWA, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031
(1992); TWA, Inc. v. Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426
(1989); Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 252-55.
200. Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA
§§101-618.
201. The problem led to the amendment of the CAA to include the Acid Deposition Program, creating a national cap-and-trade program for the reduction of sulfur oxide emissions from large sources. See CAA §§402-416, 42
U.S.C. §§7651a-7651o. Acid deposition is not the only such interstate
transport problem. “Burning coal is the main source of mercury generation
in our [Great Lakes] region and atmospheric deposition of mercury into
the Great Lakes from coal accounts for seventy five percent of those highly
toxic compounds.” Kendra Fogarty et al., Emerging Legal Issues in the Great
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could theoretically be regulated by land and water pollution statutes as well as by an air pollution statute. Pollution control statutes that regulate particular substances (for
example, PCBs) create the same sorts of problems.202 Such
substances are ubiquitous in the environment and potentially fall within the purview of the multiple environmental
media-oriented statutes. Because EPA administers most of
these statutes, it can often implement or interpret them to
avoid significant conflicts. Conflicts between EPA-administered statutes may reach the courts when environmental
advocates either challenge an EPA regulation attempting to
resolve an interstatute conflict or sue a violator of one environmental statute who defends by alleging that another
environmental statute authorized its actions.203 Statutes
administered by other agencies lead to the same types of
conflict, with less opportunity or incentive for EPA to
avoid the conflict.

1.

Atomic Energy Act

The first such conflict under the definition of pollutant arose because Congress defined pollutant in CWA
§502(6) to include “radioactive materials,” while Congress had earlier established a “pervasive regulatory
scheme”204 for source, byproducts, and special nuclear
materials under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA),205 administered by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) or later
the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Commission and the
U.S. Department of Energy. If the CWA authorized EPA
to regulate radioactive discharges from nuclear power
plants, the AEC would have lost significant authority over the development of nuclear power for peaceful
use. EPA defined pollutant to exclude material “regulated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.”206 An environmental group challenged this exclusion in Colorado
PIRG.207 The Supreme Court ruled that the CWA’s legislative history made explicit that Congress did not intend
EPA to regulate source, byproduct, and special nuclear
Lakes Such as the Public Trust Doctrine, Subterranean Rights, and Municipal
Regulatory Arrangements., 34 Can.-U.S. L.J. 279, 309 (2010).
202. Regulated by the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§26012692, ELR Stat. TSCA §§2-412. See 15 U.S.C. §2605(e).
203. Environmental plaintiffs have attempted to bring CWA citizen suits against
air pollution sources when their air pollutants eventually enter water. The
courts have summarily held that air pollution is regulated by the CAA,
not by the CWA. See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Working Grp. v. Dep’t of
Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1490-91, 27 ELR 21130 (10th Cir. 1997); see also
U.S. EPA ex rel. McKeown v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
162 F. Supp. 2d 173, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Environmental plaintiffs also
challenged EPA’s attempts to reconcile the CWA with RCRA in Chemical
Waste Mgmt. v. U.S. EPA, 976 F.2d 2, 23 ELR 20024 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and
RCRA with the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§300f to 300j-26,
ELR Stat. SDWA §§1401-1465, in NRDC v. U.S. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146, 20
ELR 21274 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
204. Train v. Colorado PIRG, 426 U.S. 1, 24, 6 ELR 20549 (1976).
205. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§2114.
206. 40 C.F.R. §22.2.
207. 426 U.S. 1. The challenge took the form of a citizen suit against EPA for
failing to carry out a mandatory duty. The challenge, however, should have
been for judicial review of EPA’s exclusionary regulation. EPA had performed its mandatory duty of promulgating regulations establishing the
§402 regulations; the plaintiff objected to the terms of those regulations.
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materials,208 although this did not rule out EPA authority
over other water pollutants discharged by nuclear power
plants, such as heat. Another environmental group later
filed suit against a mining company for its discharge of
uranium mill tailings into navigable water, with the same
outcome in the Ninth Circuit for the same reasoning.209
These decisions both ignore the canon that the later statute governs over the earlier statute;210 Congress enacted
the CWA in 1972, 18 years after the 1954 enactment of
the AEA.211 The decisions could have relied on the canon
that the specific governs over the general, for the AEA’s
jurisdiction over “source, by-product and special nuclear
materials”212 is more specific than the CWA’s jurisdiction
over pollutants or over radioactive materials generally.
All of these canons, however, can be seen as shortcuts to
determine legislative intent, and in this case, legislative
intent on the issue was directly addressed by persuasive
legislative history.213 It is worth noting that the Colorado
PIRG decision was written in the heyday of judicial use
of legislative history as an interpretive method, a practice
that has been much curtailed in more recent years214 in
favor of an emphasis on plain meaning.

2.

FIFRA

The most widespread and considered cases of conflict
between EPA-administered statutes are between the CWA
and FIFRA. FIFRA pervasively regulates consumer products; pesticides cannot be manufactured, sold, or used
until they are registered by EPA. Registration establishes
the uses to which pesticides may be put and the means
by which they can be applied for those uses. The uses
allowed and the application directions are calculated to
208. Colorado PIRG, 426 U.S. at 10-23.
209. Waste Action Project v. Dawn Mining Corp., 137 F.3d 1426, 28 ELR
21035 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit also considered the applicability
of the Uranium Mill Tailings Regulation Control Act.
210. Where a later statute conflicts with an earlier statute, it impliedly repeals the
earlier statute to the extent of the conflict. See, e.g., Dorsey v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2012).
211. Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500 (CWA); Aug. 30, 1954, Pub. L. No.
85-256 (AEA).
212. The Court in Colorado PIRG reviews the legislative history, including
explicit statements in the reports on the bill by both the responsible Senate and U.S. House of Representatives Committees, colloquies on the
floors of both chambers, and the defeat in the House of an amendment
to give states authority to regulate radioactive discharges. See 426 U.S. at
11-24. The Court found particularly persuasive an extensive dialogue on
the Senate floor between Senator Muskie, chief sponsor and author of the
CWA, and Sen. John Pastore (D-R.I.), Chair of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy.
213. The Court held that the legislative history supported the “intent to preserve the pre-existing regulatory plan.” 426 U.S. at 24. Textualists argue
that interpretation is not directed at discerning legislative intent, but only at
discerning what the statute means. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at
391-96 (discovering legislative intent included as one of treatise’s “Thirteen
Falsities Exposed”).
214. The author’s research has found that legislative history was used in 42% of
the decisions interpreting pollutant decided in 1982 or earlier, but in only
11% of such decisions decided after 1982. Much of the reason for the shift
away from reliance on legislative history was the influence of the new textualists on the courts and in academia. One treatise traces the ebb and flow of
the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history to support or escape the plain
meaning of a statute. See Eskridge, supra note 70, at 207-38.
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avoid danger to public health and unintended215 danger
to the environment. Thus, FIFRA registration establishes
whether pesticides can be applied over or near water and, if
so, the FIFRA-approved label establishes how they must be
applied over or near water.
As discussed above, several CWA decisions concern the
application of pesticides on, in, or near water. Headwaters was the first of the court of appeals decisions and the
only one directly considering a potential conflict between
FIFRA and the CWA and the consequent need to read
the statutes harmoniously. Headwaters concluded that the
statutes did not conflict because they served different purposes. The Ninth Circuit noted that FIFRA established a
“nationally uniform labeling system to regulate pesticide
use,” based on a national cost/benefit analysis weighing the
benefits of using the pesticide against the adverse environmental effects of doing so.216 Congress made no effort in
FIFRA to ensure that individual applications of pesticides
were compatible with local conditions. On the other hand,
CWA requires that §402 permits contain effluent limitations designed to achieve local water quality standards,
preventing local environmental harm from individual dischargers, as well as to achieve national technology-based
standards. The Headwaters court concluded that these
were compatible goals and that FIFRA registration did not
foreclose requiring a CWA permit for discharging chemical wastes.217
The issue of a conflict between FIFRA and the CWA
did not arise in the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent Fairhurst
decision218 because the pesticide applied in that case was a
chemical leaving no waste or excess in the water, so there
was no chemical waste and hence no pollutant. The court
erroneously noted, however, that the necessity to read the
CWA and FIFRA harmoniously was required by the Ninth
Circuit’s earlier holding in Headwaters. The Sixth Circuit
did not reconsider the issue in National Cotton Council.219

3.

Refuse Act

The CWA §402 permit program was based on the Refuse
Act Permit Program, developed by EPA and the Corps
under the Refuse Act.220 Congress took care in the CWA
to reconcile the two statutes. Sections 402(a)(4) and (5)
provide that no Refuse Act permits for discharges of refuse
into navigable waters can be issued after the enactment of
the CWA, but that applications for Refuse Act permits
filed before the date of that enactment were deemed to be
applications for CWA §402 permits. Moreover, Refuse Act
permits issued before that date were deemed to be CWA
§402 permits, and CWA §402 permits were deemed to
215. It goes without saying that the very purpose of pesticides is to damage specific living parts of the environment.
216. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532, 31 ELR
20535 (9th Cir. 2001).
217. Id. at 531-32.
218. 422 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2005).
219. National Cotton Council of Am. v. U.S. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR 20006
(6th Cir. 2009).
220. 33 U.S.C. §407.
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be Refuse Act permits. Finally, CWA §402(k) provided a
grace period until the earlier of: (1) the end of 1974 for a
permit applicant filing a timely application under §402 or
the Refuse Act; or (2) until a permit was issued or denied.
Although these measures eliminated conflict between
CWA §402 and the Refuse Act, defendants from time to
time have attempted unsuccessfully to obfuscate the applicability of the CWA by invoking the Refuse Act.221
The Refuse Act is one section of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, which includes §403222 requiring a permit
from the Corps to dredge in navigable waters. Dredging
produces dredged material or dredged spoil that must be
disposed. If dredged material was disposed elsewhere in
navigable water prior to 1972, a Refuse Act permit was
required. In 1972, CWA §404 authorized the Corps to
issue permits for the discharge of dredged and fill material into navigable waters, a function it performed earlier under the Refuse Act. Oddly, §404 did not contain
the same sort of provisions as §402 for meshing the new
permitting authority with the earlier Refuse Act. CWA
§511(a), however, provided generally that the CWA did
not supersede the authority of the Corps “to maintain
navigation” and specifically that a §404 permit “shall be
conclusive as to the effect on water quality of any discharge resulting from any activity subject to section 403
(ocean discharge) of this title.”

IV.

Conclusion

“Pollutant” is not a limiting element of the water pollution offense. Congress intended the element to reach
broadly, and it does; its statutory definition encompasses
virtually all residuals and byproducts of human activity
as well as biological materials. Courts have only held that
seven substances discharged to water by human activity do
not fall within the statutory definition of pollutant, and
there are contrary opinions concerning four of those seven
substances. Moreover, the rulings that most of the seven
substances are not pollutants were predicated on the argument that their addition to water was governed by another
statute rather than on the argument that they did not fit
within the definition of pollutant.
Perhaps, because of the broad plain meaning of the statutory definition of pollutant, there were relatively few judicial challenges to the interpretation of the element. Courts
resolved those challenges fairly easily by reference to the
plain meaning of its statutory definition, or, after time, by
reference to precedents based on the plain meaning of the
definition of the element. The author’s research has found
that courts relied on other canons of statutory construction only to a minor extent to interpret pollutant. Indeed,
courts have used only 10 canons beyond plain meaning
and precedent to interpret “pollutant,” and the courts cited
plain meaning and precedent virtually as many times as
221. See, e.g., United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 112, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir.
1977).
222. 33 U.S.C. §403.
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they cited the remaining canons in the aggregate. Most
courts recognized that Congress decoupled the meanings
of pollutant and pollution in the CWA and that a pollutant
under the statute does not have to cause pollution. Moreover, a substance does not have to result from human activity to be a pollutant.
The main problem with the definition of pollutant is
that its plain meaning sometimes seems to reach too far.
Most questionable results from that, however, are blunted
because the finding that a substance is a pollutant has no
legal effect unless all of the other elements of the water
pollution offense are also found. Even so, there are a few
specific areas in which congressional or EPA action is warranted. Most follow from the definition listing categories
of substances denominated both “material” and “waste,”
with no apparent reason for the distinction. Why did
Congress include all biological material, but only chemical, solid, industrial, and municipal waste? The inclusion
of all biological material leads to the absurd result that
propagating native fish in a hatchery and adding them to
a fishing stream can violate the CWA without a permit.
The same problem would occur for other biological material; for example, for planting wild rice or eel grass where
they have been depleted by human activity. Congress
could easily deal with this issue by a surgical amendment
changing “biological material” in CWA §502(6) to “biological wastes.” Alternatively, EPA could address the issue
by defining “biological material” to exclude “indigenous
fish or biota,” or by issuing a general permit or a permit
by regulation authorizing such discharges under appropriate conditions; for example, where the fish are native species rather than introduced species. Similar solutions are
possible for analogous reductio ad absurdum situations; for
example, people conveyed to navigable waters from diving
boards or water slides.
More difficult are the statute’s and EPA’s failures to
define waste, in particular the failure to address the issue of
whether products designed for use on or in water become
wastes when their useful life is spent. Positioning a shotgun to fire every half hour over (and therefore into) a body
of water is a classical addition of pollutants into navigable
water from a point source without a permit. However, if
that shotgun is fired only for the purpose of killing ducks
when they fly into its trajectory, it is not an addition of
pollutants even when some or all of the shot misses the
ducks and falls into the water. Variants of this fact pattern are limited only by the imagination: Examples include
spraying pesticide on mosquito larvae in water or spraying paint on a bridge.223 EPA’s reaction when faced with
such situations is to promulgate a rule exempting the discharges resulting from such activities from requiring §402
permits, a strategy that courts have rejected as contrary to
the CWA. EPA might be more successful promulgating a
223. These two examples illustrate the difficulty in this task, because pesticides
cannot be sprayed on aquatic pests without spraying waste or residue pesticides in the water, while properly placed plastic barriers can collect sprayed
paint that misses the bridge and prevent it from entering the water.

Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

44 ELR 10980

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

regulatory definition of waste, as it has done under RCRA
generally,224 or for particular substances, such as military
munitions.225 Alternatively, it could issue a permit by rule
or authorize states with approved programs to issue permits
by rule for such categories of discharges.
The distinction between pollutants subject to §402 permits and dredged and fill material subject to §404 permits
is also problematic because “fill material” does not appear
in the statutory list of substances that are “pollutants,”
although most fill material does fall within one of the categories of substances that are listed in those statutory cat-
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egories. EPA and the Corps have created a loophole in the
§402 program for requiring pollution reduction by defining fill material as anything that can change the bottom
elevation of a water body. Because toxic substances may be
solids or be attached to suspended solids in liquid waste,
such substances may be fill material regulated by §404
rather than by §402. The Supreme Court acknowledged
this loophole in Coeur Alaska.226 The agencies could easily
deal with the loophole by reverting to an earlier version of
their definitions.
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26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER
Year

+/-a

1997
1997
1997
1996
1996
1995
1994
1993
1993
1993
1993
1992
1990
1988
1988
1985
1984
1982
1979
1977
1977
1976

+
-+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-+
+
+
+
-+
+
+
+

Type of Caseb
Crim.
Cit. S.
Crim.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Enf.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Crim.
Enf.
Crim.
Jud. Rev.
Jud. Rev.
Cit. S.
Jud. Rev.
Enf.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Jud. Rev.
Jud. Rev.
Crim.
Jud. Rev.

Canons Usedc
7
1, 9
7
10
2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8
7
7
10
7
7, 8, 10, 11
7
7
7
7
7
8
7
3, 6, 8, 11
2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11
5, 8, 11, 12
7, 8, 9, 10, 11
7, 11

11-2014
Number of
Canons Used
1
2
1
1
6
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
6
4
5
2

Type of
Materiald
U
B
O
T
P
R
K
A
C
D, U
D
R
R
I
U
R, U
T
E
R
F
O
F

1
1
1
4
1
3
3
1
1
1
3
2
5
4
2
5
3
2
3
3
1
5
2
1
3
1
2
5

D, R
R
R
Q
R
M
R, U
R
R
R
R
I
R
N
B
R
R
S
M
A
R
F
J
R
I
K
R
I

District Court Decisions
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

2011
2011
2009
2008
2007
2007
2006
2005
2004
2004
2003
2002
2002
2001
2001
2000
1999
1997
1996
1995
1994
1990
1989
1989
1987
1984
1981
1982

+
+
+
-o
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
--+
-+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

Enf.
Jud. Rev.
Jud. Rev.
Cit. S.
Jud. Rev.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Jud. Rev.
Jud. Rev.
Jud. Rev.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Jud. Rev.
Enf.
Enf.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Enf.
Cit. S.
Cit. S.
Enf.
Cit. S.

7
7
7
3, 7, 9, 10
7
3, 7, 10
2, 7, 10
7
7
7
7, 10, 11
7, 10
2, 3, 7, 8, 11
3, 7, 9, 10
9, 10
2, 3, 8, 10, 11
7, 8, 11
7, 10
3, 7, 10
2, 10, 11
7
2, 3, 7, 10, 11
7, 11
7
3, 7, 10
7
7, 10
1, 2, 7, 10, 11
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11-2014
Decision
Number
66.
67.
68.
a.
b.
c.
d.

NEWS & ANALYSIS
Year

+/-a

1980
1978
1978

+
+
+

Type of Caseb
Enf.
Crim.
Cit. S.

Canons Usedc
3, 7, 10
7
1, 7

44 ELR 10983
Number of
Canons Used
3
1
2

Type of
Materiald
G, R
K
E

Plus (+) denotes an environmental positive decision in terms of defining “pollutant,” i.e., an expansive interpretation. Minus (-) denotes an environmental
negative decision, a restrictive interpretation. NOTE, even though the decision on the definition of “pollutant” may be expansive, the environmental party
may have lost the case.
Cit. S. means citizens suit; Crim. means criminal prosecution; Enf. means civil enforcement action; Jud. Rev. means judicial review.
1. Avoid absurd results; 2. Broad interpretation to effectuate statutory purpose; 3. Deference to agency interpretation of statute; 4. Ejusdem generis; 5. Exception proves the rule; 6. Exclusive/inclusive nature of definition; 7. Plain meaning; 8. Legislative history; 9. Harmonize with other statutes; 10. Precedent;
11. Structure of statute; 12. Expressio unius.
A. acid mine drainage; B. air pollutants; C. blood; D. cement; E. changes in water quality; F. chemical wastes, including chlorine residue and alum floc; G. demolition debris; H. dredged or fill material; I. fish, fish parts, and fish feces; J. listed toxics; K. manure; L. municipal solid waste; M. munitions; N. pesticides;
O. petroleum derivatives; P. produced water; Q. radioactive waste; R. rock, sand, and sediment; S. sewage; T. stormwater; U. soil and vegetation.

